



NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN

FOB KIWIBASE, BAMYAN Airfield, BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN
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25 FEB 2011


NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 055/11

Period: 241600D* FEB 2011 - 251600D* FEB 2011

Executive Summary

TALA WA BARFEK: Multiple reporting of known INS trying to secure Qari MIRAJ's release (NPRT PIR 1)

TALA WA BARFEK: Return of PSR(sen)1 to TALA WA BARFEK (NPRT PIR 1)



Area of Interest

1. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~)  **TALA WA BARFEK.** On 23 Feb 11, PSR(sen)1 reported that Qari MIRAJ, PSR(sen)1 and Commander ABDULLAH (KALTA) are attempting to contact the government to offer their services. Qari MUSA and Maulawi NEMATULLAH are currently the leaders of the TALA WA BARFEK insurgents and in PAKISTAN at the moment; they

are expected to be back in TALA WA BARFEK District in approximately a month and a half.


2. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) In separate reporting, on 25 Feb 11, **PSR(sen)1** reported that ten insurgents from TALA WA BARFEK are intending to meet with the government in a Peace Jirga IOT secure the release of INS Qari MIRAJ; the objective is to promise to cease insurgent activities but only if MIRAJ is released. **PSR(sen)1** did not know when the jirga was to be conducted but believed it is supposed to occur in TALA WA BARFEK District. The ten insurgents include five unknown personalities and the following men:

- a. Commander Abdullah KALTA, who is current in PAKISTAN,
- b. **PSR(sen)1**, from TURMUSH Village,
- c. **PSR(sen)1** and **PSR(sen)1** from BARFEK Village, and,
- d. **PSR(sen)1** from TALA Village.

3. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) Commander Abdullah KALTA will travel back from PAKISTAN to take part in the jirga. **PSR(sen)1** also reported that **PSR(sen)1** and **PSR(sen)1** are collecting weapons in the TALA WA BARFEK area for the TB.

4. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) **NZPRT S2 COMMENT**. Reports appear to corroborate a number of INS are located in TURMUSH village or intend to travel there in the near future in order to meet with government officials in TALA WA BARFEK. All of the sources are known to be linked to each other; this could be an attempt by the TALA WA BARFEK INS leaders to shape GIRoA/CF expectations of their proposed "deal" to effect the release of MIRAJ, via known information channels to the PRT and GIRoA. The desired effect would be to get the NZPRT to support the reconciliation proposal and therefore accept the release of MIRAJ; and on GIRoA, to make any opposition to this initiative by the BAMYAN Provincial government untenable. As such it is likely that a reconciliation ceremony will take place. It is possible that the names put forward will not be wanted INS or may only be minor players, that weapons will be handed in, probably having been purchased specifically for the occasion. An undertaking by the TALA WA BARFEK INS to cease INS activity in exchange for the release of MIRAJ can not be relied upon. It is unlikely that these INS will change their intent to target foreigners in both TALA WA BARFEK and BAMYAN Province. Operationally it could become difficult if CF are seen to be targeting known INS who have openly 'reconciled' but of whom we have confirmed intelligence that they continue to plan and resource attacks against foreigners in both TALA WA BARFEK and North eastern BAMYAN Province.

5. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) A significant amount of diplomatic and political pressure as been brought to bear on the Afghan government and security officials not to release MIRAJ; NZ liaison contacts have assurances from a highly placed official in NDS that he will not be released. It is therefore likely that if MIRAJ fails to be released any reconciliation gesture is likely to be reneged upon, the moral justification being that the GIRoA/CF have not upheld their end of the bargain as perceived and incorrectly expected by the INS. **END COMMENT**.

6. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~)  **TALA WA BARFEK**. On 22 Feb 11, BAMYAN **ANSF** reported that INS leader **PSR(sen)1** and ten people are in TALA WA BARFEK, their plans unknown. On 25 Feb 11, **PSR(sen)1** reported that on approximately 23 Feb 11, **PSR(sen)1** returned to TALA WA BARFEK, from PAKISTAN. **PSR(sen)1** travelled with 15 unknown people who are from other areas; they are not currently staying with him or have any further

involvement with him at this time. **PSR(sen)1** was not aware of a reason for **PSR(sen)1** return. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT**. It is possible these two reports are from the same source or represent widely known general information from the area. No corroborative reporting or further detail has been received; this information is assessed as possibly true. **PSR(sen)1** reportedly resides IVO "PASHTA DASHTI LAJAN" **PSR(sen)1** It is possible that this village may be DAST LAJAM SAHIDAN (**PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**) **END COMMENT**.

Area of Operations

GOVERNANCE

7. NSTR.

DEVELOPMENT

8. NSTR.

SECURITY

9. NSTR.

Threat Courses of Action:

10. **MLCOA**: A complex attack by a small group of INS (four to ten) initiated with an IED and reinforced with SAF targeting an NZPRT or ANSF patrol or foreigners in the north east of BAMYAN Province on MSR **PSR(S)1** from Check Point G2¹ to DO ABE² and east to ISH PESTA Check Point³. Likely atk on mobile patrols on isolated portions of the route by day and on static positions by night.

11. **MDCOA**: A change in TTP's, involving a secondary device targeting likely ICPs and/or a secondary complex attack targeting first responders.

DRAFTED BY: **PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1**

RELEASED BY: **PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3**

INT OP

S2

¹ G2 Check Point MGRS Grid **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

² DO ABE MGRS Grid **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

³ ISH PESTA Check Point MGRS Grid **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

Comd TU CRIB XVII Priority Intelligence Requirements

1. PIR 1. What are the kinetic threats to stability within BAMYAN Province?
2. PIR 2. What are the non-kinetic influences that have the potential to create instability within BAMYAN Province?
3. PIR 3. What is the capacity and local perceptions of the security structures (ANP, NDS, OCC-P and NZPRT) within BAMYAN Province?
4. PIR 4. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Development and Reconstruction within the BAMYAN Province?
5. PIR 5. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Governance within the BAMYAN Province?

LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE	
CONFIRMED	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
PROBABLE	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
LIKELY	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
POSSIBLE	Approximately 15 per cent or greater
DOUBTFUL	Approximately 14 per cent or less

List of internal and
external recipients
of Intsum

Distribution:

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3