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TF81 SITREP 40/10

3 Oct 10

COMJFNZ

TASK FORCE 81 (OP WĀTEA) – SITREP 40/10

J1. Personnel Matters

1. **Locations.** OP WĀTEA currently has ^{PSR(S)2, P} people in theatre as follows:
 - a. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** located in CAMP WAREHOUSE, KABUL.
 - b. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** located with CRU, KABUL.
 - c. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** located with CRU, **PSR(S)1**.
 - e. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** located at **PSR(S)1**, KABUL.
 - f. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** located at RC-E, BAGRAM.
 - g. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** located at KAF, KANDAHAR.
2. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** with OP WĀTEA 3 arrived in theatre on 2 Oct 10. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** with OP WĀTEA 3 arrived in theatre on 3 Oct 10.
3. **Medical.** NSTR.

J2. Intelligence.

4. Liaison with OP CRIB continues over threats to the BAMYAN province. It is envisaged this will continue for the foreseeable future, in order for TF81 to maintain situational awareness and passage of information.
5. See attached INTSUM (Annex A).

J3. Operational Matters.

6. TF81 continues to focus on operations with the Ministry of Interior (MOI) for short notice tasks in support of CRU ^{PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR} through the disruption of insurgent movement, leadership and supply throughout Kabul and its surrounding provinces. OP WĀTEA command handover continues with the WĀTEA 3 advance party.

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7. The arrival of OP WATEA 3 yesterday signalled the commencement of the HOTO programme. Operations will continue with several tasks planned prior to the formal Transfer of Authority between OP WATEA 2 and OP WATEA 3 to occur 061700 Oct 10.

J4. Logistic Matters.

8. **PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

J5. Plans.

9. TF81 will continue to conduct operations in Kabul and its surrounding provinces in response to time sensitive intelligence. Main effort will focus disruption to INS networks prior to the INS command withdrawal to Pakistan for winter.

10. **OP WATEA RIP.** TF81 acknowledges confirmed numbers for Rotation 2 pers leaving theatre on 9 and 10 Oct to CM. 9 Oct: **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** 10 Oct: **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

J6. Communications and Information Systems

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11. NSTR.

J7. Training and Coordination.

12. The Embedded training Team continue with CRU Immersion training at **PSR(S)1**
The S4 attended the inaugural MOI/CSTC-A logistic course with the CRU S4 staff, which began 02 Oct.

J8. Mission observations, issues and evaluation.

13. NSTR.

J9. Finance Issues.

14. Visited **PSR(S)1** on 28 Sep as part of the hand over of S9 responsibilities. Could not locate a cash office, however discussed payment with **PSR(IC)3** RC-Capital **PSR(Sen)1** regards payment. They are not set up to receive cash payments. It is there understanding that there is a Nation to Nation / Force to Force agreement and that the accounts are paid through this process. S9 will hold the accounts for future reference if required.

Command Comment

15. TF81 is undergoing a busy period currently. Op tempo remains high with a number of jobs being conducted over the RIP period. This has the benefit of allowing the new command team to be involved in the planning and execution of these

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missions. The Handover taker over (HOTO) program has commenced yesterday and will be complete for transfer of authority on 06 Oct. Planning for the CPP task in support of CDF and MINPOL visit period 06-10 Oct continues.

16. TF81 and CRU disrupted INS plans to attack the NZPRT over their RIP period last night. This task has taken considerable effort to organise from a theatre perspective. In the eventuality, there were multiple decision briefs at multiple levels across ISAF and GIRoA to get the mission accomplished. Any one of these decision thresholds could have stopped the mission going ahead. Support from COMISAFSOF **PSR(IC)3, PSR(Sen)1** and the relationships that Op Wātea 2 has built up over their tour were instrumental in getting a green light **PSR(S)1**

TF81 will monitor the **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** from this mission and will remain prepared to support the NZPRT in the future.

C.J. PARSONS
LT COL
SNO

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Annexes

A. INTSUM TF81-051

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TASK FORCE 81
CAMP WAREHOUSE
KABUL

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY TF81-051
3 OCT 2010

SUMMARY OF THREAT ACTIVITY OVER PERIOD 27 SEP – 03 OCT 10.

1. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Uncorroborated reporting this week indicates INS planning to conduct attacks against various CF compounds including Camp WAREHOUSE as well as United Nations compounds.
2. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ **S2 COMMENT:** It is assessed IDF threats continue to be the most likely insurgent method of attack based on recent attacks. However, there will likely be increased indications of INS planning over the coming weeks as INS commanders come under greater pressure to attack prominent GIRoA, ISAF, and international targets to mitigate poor performance and generate propaganda that discredits GIRoA/ISAF security effectiveness. **END COMMENT.**

AO REPORTING

3. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ ~~SECRET~~ KABUL CITY PDS 2, 5, 8 and 9 are assessed as posing a HIGH level of threat to ISAF forces (CW sits on the boundary of PD 9). ISAF define a HIGH threat as:

PSR(S)1

CCIR Reporting (IAW HQJFNZ OPINSTR 118/09)

4. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Significant changes in the threat environment (including IED/suicide type threats) in Kabul and TF81 Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR): Ongoing suicide bomber, IED and rocket threats remain prevalent.
5. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Specific threats to TF81 and Camp Warehouse (Kabul): Generic IDF threat against various international targets including Camp Warehouse.
6. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ ANSF capacity and effectiveness in TF81 AIR: NSTR
7. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ ISAF capacity and effectiveness in TF81 AIR: NSTR.

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8. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Other Points: NSTR.

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PSR(IC)3

S2

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