UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

7 June 2019

Mr. Bradley Moss
Mr. Mark Zaid
The James Madison Project
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Moss and Mr. Zaid,

This responds to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and subsequent complaint filed by your clients, The James Madison Project, Richard McLeod, and Nicky Hager v. Department of Defense and other agencies, Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00463-TJK. The requesters sought copies of records created, received and/or maintained by United States Central Command (USCENTCOM); including cross-references, specifically: (1) all documentation – including, but not limited to, memoranda, transcripts, notes and video or audio recordings – memorializing the entirety of the investigation into a military operation conducted on or about 22 August 2010, by United States (U.S.), Afghan and New Zealand Forces in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan, and which the requesters understand to have been codenamed Operation BURNHAM; (2) to the extent it is not encompassed by category #1, all documentation reflecting factual findings and/or policy recommendations regarding Operation BURNHAM, including, but not limited to, civilian casualties and misconduct by government personnel; and 3) to the extent it is not encompassed by category #1, all documentation reflecting substantive determinations regarding the extent to which disciplinary action should be imposed against any personnel involved in Operation BURNHAM information regarding a military operation conducted by New Zealand, U.S. and Afghan forces on 22 August 2010 in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan, code named "Operation BURNHAM", and all related materials.

USCENTCOM conducted a thorough good faith search and located 103 pages and three video clips. After reviewing the records, I am withholding 16 pages in their entirety and partially releasing 87 pages and three video clips to you. The withheld information is exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), applying Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, sections 1.4(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; 1.4(c) intelligence activities, sources or methods; 1.4(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; and 1.4(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems relating to the national security or defense against terrorism. Additional information is withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) as it relates to 10 U.S.C. § 130b personnel in overseas, sensitive or routinely deployable units; (b)(5) inter-agency and intra-agency memorandum; and (b)(6) personal privacy interests.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Daniel Schaefer at Department of Justice, by telephone at (202) 252-2531.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Kurilla
Major General, U.S. Army

Enclosures:
1. AR 15-6 Investigation Report CIVCAS, Tigiran Village, 22 Aug 10
2. Storyboard-OP BURNHAM-JD
3. Storyboard-OP BURNHAM BDA-JD
4. Storyboard MC-12_Freedom11
5. Storyboard MC-12_Freedom17
6. Video Clip 1
7. Video Clip 2
8. Video Clip 3

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

12 June 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Litigation, Case #1:19-cv-00463

Refs: (a) Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 December 2009
(b) DoD Manual 5400.07, DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program, 25 January 2017

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to search for and review information responsive to the FOIA requests and subsequent litigation, Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00463-TJK, filed by The James Madison Project, Richard McLeod and Nicky Hager against DoD and other agencies. Plaintiffs sought information on a military operation conducted by New Zealand, U.S., and Afghan forces on 22 August 2010 in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan, code named "Operation BURNHAM", and all related materials.

2. USCENTCOM conducted a thorough good faith search and located 103 pages and three video clips. After reviewing the records, I am withholding 16 pages in their entirety and partially releasing 87 pages and the three video clips. The withheld information is exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), applying Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, sections 1.4(a), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), and 1.4(g). Additional information is withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) as it relates to 10 U.S.C. § 130b, (b)(5), and (b)(6).

3. I recommend the Joint Staff coordinate with the New Zealand government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to ensure our Coalition partners have no objection to release of the material. We will hold off on sending the releasable documents and video clips to the Plaintiffs until we receive DoD approval. Additionally, the releasable and reviewed documents were made available to the New Zealand, Senior National Representative currently stationed at USCENTCOM.

4. If you have questions, please contact the FOIA Requester Service Center at (813) 529-6285, centcom.macdill.centcom-hq.mbx.freedom-of-information-act@mail.mil, and refer to case #s 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L.

MICHAEL E. KURILLA
Major General, U.S. Army

Attachments:
TAB A: Release Letter to Plaintiffs (FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L)
TAB B: Releasable Documents (103 pages) and Three Video-clips


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RC/N BAGHLAN, TALAH WA BARFAK DISTRICT, AF
(b)(1)1.4a
DOI: 25 JUL 10
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(b)(1)1.4a
STRUCTURES
USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L
~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//MR~~
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SVOIP: (b)(6)


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DOI: 25 JUL 10
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Approved for Release
USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L
~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//MR~~
CLOSE-UP 3
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(b)(1)1.4a GEOINT (I)
SVOIP: (b)(6)


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DOI: 25 JUL 10
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(b)(1)1.4a
POSSIBLE WALK THROUGH BETWEEN THE TWO BUILDINGS
STRUCTURES
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(b)(1)1.4a GEOINT (I)
SVOIP: (b)(6)

Approved for Release
USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057

USCENTCOM FOIA's 17-0685, 18-0461, 19-0057L
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POSSIBLE NEMATULLAH LOCATION
RC/N BAGHLAN, TALAH WA BARFAK DISTRICT, AF
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DOI: 25 JUL 10
SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//MR
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(b)(1)1.4a GEOINT (I)
SVOIP: (b)(6)

USCENTCOM FOIA's 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L

POSSIBLE KALTA LOCATION
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(b)(1)1.4a
DOI: 25 JUL 10
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
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STRUCTURES
USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L
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SVOIP (b)(6)

POSSIBLE MIRAGE LOCATION
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DOI: 25 JUL 10
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Approved for Release
USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L
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CLOSE-UP 7
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(b)(1)1.4a GEOINT (I)
SVOIP: (b)(6)

POSSIBLE MIRAGE LOCATION
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+ : (b)(1)1.4a
DOI: 25 JUL 10
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USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L
~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//MR~~
CLOSE-UP 8
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(b)(1)1.4a GEOINT (I)
SVOIP (b)(6)

Pages 1 through 4 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Session Start: Sat Aug 14 00:00:00 2010

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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20:08:53:pm:Saturday <ISAF_TF81> All good for Obj BURNHAM?
20:08:57:pm:Saturday <Freedom17_SO_MH> eyes on Burnham 1538z
20:09:29:pm:Saturday <Freedom17_SO_MH> getting below the weather at (b)(1)1.4a
20:10:14:pm:Saturday <ISAF_TF81> c
20:10:42:pm:Saturday <ISAF_TF81> How is the detection concern at this level?
20:11:39:pm:Saturday <ISAF_TF81> High detection on these tgts



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Pages 3 through 4 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Session Close: Sun Aug 15 00:00:00 2010

Approved for release

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HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces-Afghanistan
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A-SJA (10-125)

19 OCT 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Action Memo - Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the 22 August 2010 Partnered Operation in Tigiran Village, Afghanistan, Possibly Resulting in CIVCAS

1. I have reviewed the AR 15-6 investigation conducted by (b)(3), (b)(6) into the facts and circumstances surrounding the partnered operation in Tigiran Village, Afghanistan, on 22 August 2010, which may have resulted in one or more civilian casualties. The Investigating Officer's (IO's) findings and recommendations are approved.

2. I hereby direct the findings and recommendations be forwarded to IJC CJ3 to consider the IO's recommendation with respect to the need for a theater-wide SOP/FRAGO that describes the requirements for weapons system video. I further direct the findings and recommendations be forwarded to IJC CJ3 and CJ7 to consider the IO's recommendation regarding the dissemination of IAT lessons learned.

David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces-Afghanistan

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

USFOR-A-SJA (10-125)

14 OCT 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR CDR, USFOR-A

SUBJECT: Legal Review of AR 15-6 Report of Investigation

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

17 SEP 2010

USFOR-A-SJA (10-125)

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3), (b)(6) ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, APO AE 09356

SUBJECT: Appointment Order - Investigating Officer (IO) Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6

1. You are hereby appointed by the Commander, USFOR-A as an IO pursuant to AR 15-6, Chapter 2, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officer*, to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the partnered operation in the Tigiran Village on 22 August 2010 which may have resulted in one or more civilian casualties. As part of your investigation you will review the weapon system video (WSV) feed from all aircraft involved in the incident and determine whether video was intentionally and wrongfully altered or deleted. This investigation is your primary mission until you tender your completed findings and recommendations to me, no later than 15 days from the date appointed. Your appointment remains in effect until the investigation is completed and no further investigation is required, unless released sooner by the appointing authority.

2. The scope of your investigation is as broad as necessary. However, you will at a minimum ascertain the following:

a. The facts and circumstances surrounding the partnered operation between (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d on 22 August 2010 (including the 5 W's).

b. The mission at the time of the incident. What was the pre-mission briefing for enemy forces and threats?

c. The threat analysis and the measures utilized by Coalition Forces on that day in order to avoid civilian casualties.

d. Whether or not there was a civilian casualty as defined in ISAF SOP 307.

e. The medical treatment provided to the casualties, if any. Whether the MEDEVAC procedures were timely and appropriate under the circumstances.

f. The nature and extent of the injuries to any individuals killed as well as the nature and extent of the injuries to any wounded individuals. Include the long-term prognosis for those who were injured.

g. Recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition measures and to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures that will help avoid this type of incident in the future.

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USFOR-SJA (10-125)
SUBJECT: Appointment Order - Investigating Officer (IO) Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6

h. Whether any WSV was altered in any way. If so, who, what, where, when, why, and how as well as determining, if possible, what the tape showed prior to being altered.

i. Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant.

3. Before you begin your investigation, you must receive a briefing from (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief of Administrative Law, USFOR-A, who has been appointed as your legal advisor. He can be reached at (b)(3), (b)(6) You must consult with your legal advisor regarding all aspects of this investigation, including developing an investigation plan.

4. You are to conduct this investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapter 3, AR 15-6. No individual has been named as a respondent at this time. All witnesses will be sworn-in prior to their interview. You are to thoroughly document all witness interviews in writing, preferably on a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). You will interview all witnesses in person, if practical. Reduce any oral statements to memorandums for record.

5. If, in the course of your investigation, you come to reasonably suspect that a person committed criminal acts, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ (right against self-incrimination, outlined in DA Form 3881 warnings), or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate. Witness waivers of their Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights will be documented on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate). In addition, you may need to provide a witness with a Privacy Act statement before you solicit any personal information. You are strongly encouraged to consult your legal advisor in the event you suspect someone of an offense or if you have any questions regarding these procedures.

6. You may interview and examine documents of personnel senior to you. If in the course of your investigation you determine that the investigation will require you to examine the conduct or performance of duty of a service member senior to you, or to which you have a moral or ethical conflict, then you shall report that fact to your legal advisor immediately.

7. From the evidence, you will make findings and recommendations.

a. Findings will be as thorough as necessary to fully capture the facts and circumstances surrounding the scope of this investigation. You have the discretion to use any of the following methods: examination of relevant documents; visiting relevant locations; evaluating procedures; conducting inventories; taking pictures; and interviewing witnesses, documenting all in writing or otherwise. You are not limited to these means of investigation, and your legal advisor may provide you with additional guidance.

b. In developing your recommendations, ensure that your findings support your recommendations. Develop in your recommendations any courses of action that seem appropriate to resolve any issues or problems raised by your findings, and recommend

USFOR-SJA (10-125)
SUBJECT: Appointment Order - Investigating Officer (IO) Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6

whether judicial proceedings, non-judicial proceedings, or further investigations are warranted.

8. Your final report will include a table of contents, and all exhibits will be tabbed. Address your findings and recommendations to the appointing authority. Submit the completed report, along with the completed DA Form 1574, to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A, for a legal review immediately following completion of your investigation. Submit any request for delay or modification of the scope of your investigation to Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A, through your legal advisor.

9. This appointment authorizes priority 1 travel status throughout the AOR in order to conduct the investigation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deputy Staff Judge Advocate

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

ISAF/IJC

30 September 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, AR 15-6 Investigation – Tigiran Village

1. On 17 September 2010, the Commander, USFOR-A, appointed me as an investigating officer (IO) in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the partnered operation in the Tigiran Village on 22 August 2010 which may have resulted in one or more civilian casualties.

2. *Executive Summary*: On 22 August 2010, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d conducted a partnered operation supported by an AH-64 air weapons team (AWT) and an AC-130 gunship to kill/capture Objective (b)(1)1.4a and Objective (b)(1)1.4a in Tigiran Village, Talawe Berfak District, Baghlan Province, RC North. Following the operation there were some allegations of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) in the Tigiran Village. An Incident Assessment Team (IAT) submitted an executive summary of the events surrounding the CIVCAS allegations [Exhibit 3 – IAT Executive Summary]. Based on additional review of the weapons system video (WSV) from the AWT and the AC-130, the IAT lead recommended a comprehensive investigation to review the IAT findings, to thoroughly review the WSV, and determine if someone intentionally edited the WSV to shape the IAT's report [Exhibit 2 – IAT Executive Summary addendum].

For this investigation, I reviewed both the AWT video [Exhibit 22] and the AC-130 video [Exhibit 23]. The AWT video was an edited video, in accordance with unit SOP, which showed positive identification of enemy personnel with weapons, clearance authority for the engagements, engagement of enemy personnel, as well as battle damage assessment. The AC-130 video was an unedited version of the full length of the operation. In reviewing the WSV, it was noted that the AWT video did not include some audio that referenced a female being among a huddled group that was near the engagement area. The AC-130 video, however, contained this audio. The AC-130 video also provided a broader perspective of the engagement area and showed some of the rounds from the AWT engagement impacting the roofs of two of the buildings. This perspective cannot be seen in the AWT video due to the limited field of view and size (4 inches by 4 inches) of their displays. The investigation interviews focused on this segment of the audio/video that was not included in the edited version of the AWT video and the potential for civilian casualties with regard to the AWT engagements.

(b)(1)1.4a

ISAF/IJC
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, AR 15-6 Investigation – Tigiran Village



The AWT crews were also having communication difficulties trying to get in touch with ground units to relay the situation to them. The AWT crews stated in their post-mission debrief [Exhibit 12] that they felt a heightened sense of urgency due to the sheer volume of personnel fleeing the objective and the challenges of maintaining continuous PID due to terrain restrictions. As a result of this lack of communication, friendly ground units ended up in very close proximity to these insurgents with weapons and there was concern about a potential fire fight. The AWT crews were unable to get in touch with the JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Controller) and therefore made the decision not to engage the insurgents that were positively identified with weapons even though they were a threat to friendly forces [Exhibit 10 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement].

The AWT crews were sensitive to the Tactical Directive throughout the engagements and made specific mention of not engaging individuals positively identified with weapons due to their close proximity to buildings in the area. In their post-mission debrief [Exhibit 12], crews stated that there were several occasions where the insurgents had closed to within hand grenade range of coalition troops. Due to communication difficulties and proximity to

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friendly forces, engagement of enemy personnel was not possible. The AWT crews stated that they chose not to engage on at least five targets that they were cleared to engage based on the Tactical Directive.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Based on my interviews with all of the crews, the Airborne Mission Commander, and the Specialist who edited the video, I determined that the AWT video was not edited with the intent to mislead the IAT or shape their report. The editing process for this video followed unit SOP and was completed prior to the IAT's request for the video. Per unit SOP, following any significant event or any weapons engagement, the Air Mission Commander will, immediately upon landing, secure the tape/hard drive from each Pilot-in-Command and without delay, turn in tapes/hard drives [Exhibit 19 – Video recorder use and Gun Tape security procedures message]. If there is a concern of collateral damage, civilian casualties, friendly fire or any other event deemed significant, then the entire video will be saved

[Exhibit 6 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. Based on the footage available, there were no such concerns, so the entire footage was not saved. The commander designates which video segments will be downloaded and how the editing will be done [Exhibit 20 – Gun Tape Editing requirements]. This edited video must be approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) the Company Commander and (b)(3), (b)(6) the Task Force Knighthawk Commander. The video is then provided to the chain of command for review. This editing is done immediately after the mission is complete and therefore the entire length of footage is not saved, and the RMM is available for the pilots to use again after editing is complete [Exhibit 19 – Gun Tape Procedures, Exhibit 20 -- Editing Requirements]. When the RMM is returned to circulation and use in the helicopters, it records over previously saved data. This particular engagement has since been recorded over.

(b)(1)1.4a

3. Findings.

a. *Question*: What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the partnered operation between (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d on 22 August 2010, specifically in regard to the AWT CIVCAS allegations (5Ws)?

Findings (Snapshot - 5Ws):

- Who: 3rd Aviation Regiment, 1st Battalion, B Company (AWT)
- What: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (AWT) conducted air assault security for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
- When: 22 August 2010, approximately 0100L
- Where: Tigiran Village, Talawe Berfak District, Baghlan Province, RC North (IVO (b)(1)1.4a
- Why: To facilitate the deliberate detention of insurgent targets in order to severely disrupt operations in the area of operations.

Findings: The call signs for the two Apaches that departed Bagram AB in order to support the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d partnered operation in Tigiran Village were (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). In (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the pilot in command and (b)(3), (b)(6) was the gunner (b)(3), (b)(6)

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ISAF/IJC
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, AR 15-6 Investigation – Tigiran Village

(b)(3), (b)(6) piloted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) while (b)(3), (b)(6) was his gunner. The objective of the operation was to infil (b)(1)1.4d forces into three helicopter landing zones (HLZ) to detain two personnel thought to be responsible for the deaths of (b)(1)1.4d troops (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived over the HLZs and assessed all of the HLZs as secure. (b)(1)1.4a flight and (b)(1)1.4a (AC-130) were in direct communication and began inspecting the immediate areas surrounding the HLZ. (b)(1)1.4a were unsuccessful in establishing communications with the ground force commander (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) or the JTAC (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) While inspecting the area around the HLZ, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) identified five personnel with weapons exiting a qalat within 200 meters of the HLZ [Exhibit 12 -- Mission Debrief]. The weapons system video clearly shows armed male adults exiting the buildings [Exhibit 14, Screen shot showing armed insurgents]. A stop-motion analysis completed by the IAT of all the figures also shows two adult females and three children exiting one building next to the insurgents with weapons and moving rapidly into the adjacent building less than 5 meters away [Exhibit 15, Screen shot showing civilians in the area near insurgents with weapons]. (b)(1)1.4a flight was initially unaware of these civilians as they were focused on the insurgents with the weapons in close proximity to the HLZ and friendly ground forces.

(b)(1)1.4a flight made repeated attempts to raise the JTAC and ground force commander to pass information about the insurgents moving near the HLZ. As the personnel egressed the house, (b)(1)1.4a flight and (b)(1)1.4a divided efforts to monitor all personnel. Finally, (b)(1)1.4a flight was able to contact the JTAC and relayed all of the pertinent information concerning the insurgents' movements. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) approved immediate attacks on enemy personnel PID with weapons. (b)(1)1.4a flight engaged two personnel with weapons climbing up the terrain above the friendly location – two Enemy Killed in Action (EKIA) [Exhibit 12 -- Mission Debrief]. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) both attempted to engage one insurgent coming back down the hill with no apparent effect on the individual. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted the first engagement and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted the second engagement, as can be seen in the weapons system video [Exhibit 22]. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) burst of 30mm missed the intended target with no collateral damage concerns. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) attempted to re-engage when the insurgent was crouched against a hillside and had not yet reached the buildings. Due to problems with weapon accuracy, the 30mm bursts missed the intended target and instead hit close to qalats and on the roofs of two of the buildings [Exhibit 16 -- AWT screen shot of rounds impacting, Exhibit 17 -- AC-130 screen shot of rounds impacting buildings]. At the time of the engagement, (b)(1)1.4a flight was unaware that any of the rounds had impacted the roofs of the buildings since their display screen did not show the buildings within their field of view. This information was only obtained once I reviewed the AC-130 video with them. (b)(1)1.4a flight did not attempt further engagements as the individual had moved closer to the village increasing the possibility of collateral damage [Exhibit 12 – Mission Debrief]. (b)(1)1.4a continued surveillance on the surrounding areas identifying multiple individuals moving around tactically and bounding behind terrain for cover. Both (b)(1)1.4a flight engaged these individuals. Upon completing this engagement, all assets continued looking for threats (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) identified additional armed personnel walking down a road in the same area and engaged the enemy personnel – 1xEKIA. (b)(1)1.4a element continued with surveillance and overhead security until extraction was arranged [Exhibit 12 -- Mission Debrief].

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Conclusions: The IAT executive summary stated that all engagements appeared to be in accordance with appropriate ROE and the Tactical Directive [Exhibit 3 -- IAT Executive Summary]. This investigation concurs with the IAT findings. Although there are areas where things could have been done differently or better, the unit effectively used this mission as a way to make improvements in their processes with regard to weapons maintenance, crew training, and overall understanding of the Tactical Directive. It is also important to understand the stresses placed upon the crew at the time of the mission – night, terrain, poor communications, and a high threat level to friendly forces all played into the situation.

b. *Question*: The mission at the time of the incident. What was the pre-mission briefing for enemy forces and threats?

Findings: The IAT confirmed that this site has no GIRoA presence and is Taliban controlled [Exhibit 3 – IAT Executive Summary]. Based on interviews with the AWT crew, they were also briefed that this area had not been visited by coalition forces in approximately 10 years.

Conclusions: Based on the interviews conducted, I believe that the pre-mission briefing was adequate for the situation that the crews encountered.

c. *Question*: The threat analysis and the measures utilized by Coalition Forces on that day to avoid civilian casualties?

Findings: The S-2 provided a detailed brief of the area before the mission. The brief talked about patterns of life in the area. They knew that there could be civilians in the area and that they would have to be cautious with fires. They also knew that there were enemies in the area and that there was a chance of a firefight [Exhibit 6 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. The crews were told that they were the first coalition forces to be in that area in about 10 years so they were expecting some enemy resistance [Exhibit 4 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. The crews stated that they do not go into complete detail on rules of engagement prior to each mission, but it is discussed and all crews are aware of the ROE [Exhibit 5 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement].

Although the women and children can be seen in the WSV, there is nothing to indicate that either (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) saw the women and children until such time as (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) (b)(6) commented on it. When reviewing the video I had the luxury of watching it on a larger screen and rewinding it. The cockpit of the Apache has four inch monitors and does not have the capability to rewind. Additionally, there were numerous factors vying for the crews' attention – night, terrain, communication issues, and a very realistic threat to friendly forces. The AWT crews stated that they were aware of civilians in the area after the engagements and the crews discussed ceasing fire when they saw the women and children in the area [Exhibit 4 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. The audio from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), further states: "This is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), we have five non-friendly personnel next to a building approximately 200 meters in front of your ground patrol, the ground patrol is moving toward the people, huddled by the building, at least one is female" [Exhibit 18 -- WSV Transcript]. It would appear that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), was aware of the potential civilians in the area prior to their last engagement when they

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engaged the insurgent moving towards the buildings. In summarizing the sequence of the engagement, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Pilot-in-Command) stated: I do not entirely remember the situation in question. There was a point when we were engaging one man that appeared to be wounded and he was evading. We lost sight of him for a minute and then a group of women and children came into view running in a separate direction. We ceased to engage that individual because of the women and children [Exhibit 4 – (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. A

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

In their post-mission debrief [Exhibit 12], crews stated that there were several occasions where the insurgents had closed to within hand grenade range of coalition troops. The crews stated that they chose not to engage on at least five targets that they were cleared to engage based on the Tactical Directive. The crews felt that they were conservative on this mission and showed appropriate restraint in accordance with the Tactical Directive while still ensuring the safety of friendly ground forces [Exhibit 4 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement].

Conclusions: Based on the interviews conducted, I determined that the threat analysis was appropriate for the mission. Based on the interviews conducted and review of the weapons system audio and video, I found that crews were sensitive to the Tactical Directive [Exhibit 25] throughout the engagements and that their actions were appropriate in order to avoid civilian casualties. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

d. *Question*: Whether or not there was a civilian casualty as defined in ISAF SOP 307.

Findings: Based on WSV review and crew interviews, it is likely that there were women and children present in the area for some of the engagements. However, there is no evidence to confirm that any of the AWT rounds impacted areas where civilians were definitively located. The AC-130 video [Exhibit 23] shows AWT rounds impacting roofs of some of the buildings where it is possible that civilians were located [Exhibit 17 – AC-130 screen shot showing where rounds impacted the buildings]. However, ground BDA was not conducted on those buildings so there is no way of knowing if the AWT errant rounds caused civilian casualties. The AWT and ground units were unaware that bullets had impacted the buildings until the time of this investigation. The IAT was also unable to confirm civilian casualties based on their review immediately following the incident [Exhibit 3 – IAT Executive Summary].

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Conclusions: This investigation concurs with the IAT observation that based on WSV evidence it is possible that CIVCAS occurred because at the time of the AWT engagement, women and children appear to have been present [Exhibit 3 -- IAT Executive Summary]. However, there is no evidence in the video that confirms that there were civilian casualties. The only piece of information that can be confirmed is that rounds impacted the roofs of buildings where it is possible that civilians were located. Based on evidence that I reviewed, I concur with the IAT findings that civilian casualties are possible, but cannot be confirmed.

e. *Question*: The medical treatment provided to the casualties, if any. Whether the MEDEVAC procedures were timely and appropriate under the circumstances.

Findings: This investigation did not address this issue.

Conclusions: There were no confirmed civilian casualties during this incident [Exhibit 3 -- IAT Executive Summary].

f. *Question*: The nature and extent of the injuries to any individual killed as well as the nature and extent of the injuries to any wounded individuals. Include the long-term prognosis for those who were injured.

Findings: This investigation did not address this issue.

Conclusions: There were no confirmed civilian casualties during this incident [Exhibit 3 -- IAT Executive Summary].

g. *Question*: Whether any WSV was altered in any way. If so, who, what, where, when, why, and how as well as determining, if possible, what the tape showed prior to being altered.

Findings: The AWT unit has a limited number of recording devices, RMMs (remote memory modules) due to the high cost of these devices. During flights, air crew will often start and stop the recording of their RMM device in order to ensure that there is enough memory space to capture key events. Due to the limited number of RMMs and to ensure that they are available for every flight, it is SOP to download specific segments of the video and provide an edited compilation of key segments following a mission where engagements have occurred [Exhibit 9 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. Per unit SOP, following any significant event or any weapons engagement, the Air Mission Commander will, immediately upon landing, secure the tape/hard drive from each Pilot-in-Command and without delay, turn in tapes/hard drives [Exhibit 19 – Video recorder use and Gun Tape security procedures message]. When a crew conducts an engagement, they will call back to the unit to report the engagement so that a specialist is available to download and edit the video [Exhibit 7 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. The video editing is not done by the aircrew and is conducted by a trained Specialist (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. There is not enough space on the hard drives to download and save the entire length of footage and an edited version provides the key segments for the chain of command to review. The commander designates which video segments will be downloaded and how the editing will be done [Exhibit 20 – Gun Tape Editing requirements]. This edited

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video must be approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) the Company Commander and (b)(3), (b)(6) the Task Force Knighthawk Commander. The video is then provided to the chain of command for review. This editing is done immediately after the mission is complete and therefore the entire length of footage is not saved, and the RMM is used again as soon as it becomes available [Exhibit 19 – Gun Tape Procedures, Exhibit 20 - Editing Requirements]. When the RMM is returned to circulation and use in the helicopters, it records over previously saved data.

If there is a concern of collateral damage, civilian casualties, friendly-fire, or any other event deemed significant, then the entire video will be saved [Exhibit 6 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement]. (b)(3), (b)(6) specifically stated that if he had known that the bullets from the AWT had impacted the roofs of the qalats, then he would have saved the entire video. By the time the civilian casualty allegations were made and the unit was notified that the WSV was needed for the IAT, the video had already been edited and the RMM had already been erased and used on another mission [Exhibit 9 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement].

For this investigation, I reviewed both the AWT video [Exhibit 22] and the AC-130 video [Exhibit 23]. The AWT video was an edited video, in accordance with unit SOP, which showed positive identification of enemy personnel with weapons, clearance authority for the engagements, engagement of enemy personnel, as well as battle damage assessment. The AC-130 video was an unedited version of the full length of the operation. In reviewing the WSV, it was noted that the AWT video did not include some audio that referenced a female being among a huddled group that was near the engagement area. The AC-130 video contained this audio. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that no one specifically asked him to remove anything from the video or cut anything out of the video. He further stated that editing this video followed the same procedures as all of the other videos that he has edited. After

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

also stated that he did not direct anything specific to be cut or removed from the video [Exhibit 8 -- (b)(3), (b)(6) statement].

Conclusions: Based on limited equipment and unit SOP, I find that the unit's procedures are adequate for ensuring that video is downloaded and saved appropriately. I also find that the crews and unit acted in compliance with their SOP in this case. The gun tape editing requirements message from the commander [Exhibit 20], clearly explains the importance of gun tapes: "Tapes of engagements can be used to promote a positive message by providing evidence of the professionalism of our pilots. If in the editing process, valuable footage is left out, the tapes can present the wrong story and be harmful to the overall I/O campaign of USFOR-A." Unfortunately, there was some audio that appears to have been inadvertently omitted from the edited version of the tape that the IAT deemed important to their overall assessment. However, based on my interviews with all of the crews, the Airborne Mission Commander, the Specialist who edited the video, and the unit leadership, I do not believe that anyone intentionally edited the video with the intent to mislead or shape the IAT report.

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4. Recommendations:

a. There should be a theater-wide SOP/FRAGO that describes the requirements for weapons system video. This SOP/FRAGO should include which items are required to be downloaded and saved for future use (i.e. PID, clearance of fires, engagement, BDA, etc). It should also state certain conditions where the entire mission is required to be saved (i.e. civilian casualty allegations, friendly fire incidents, collateral damage concerns, etc). This document should also state conditions where the video needs to be forwarded to higher headquarters as well as the timeline for this to occur. For an IAT, full-length, unedited WSV must be made immediately available. This information should also be added to the Special Instructions (SPINS) for Air and Space Operations in Afghanistan.

b. IAT report lessons learned should be made available to units involved so that they can learn from the incident and we can ensure similar incidents do not occur. Additionally, in accordance with IJC SOP 332, CJ37 should post all IAT lessons learned to ensure widest dissemination. We can all learn from each other's mistakes and experiences. This unit was primarily unaware of the issues related to the IAT and could have benefited from lessons learned from the report.

c. As with any mission, aircrew and ground units should make every possible effort to debrief lessons learned following the mission. Although this is more difficult in a combat environment, units should still strive to conduct a debrief after the mission. In this case, it would have been beneficial to have the AWT crews debrief with the AC-130 crew as they could have provided a broader perspective of what occurred in the engagement area, specifically including the information that bullets had impacted the roofs of some of the buildings. Additionally, every crew member I interviewed stated that communications were a major problem during this mission. It is critical that aircrew and ground units debrief these issues so that it does not occur on future missions. However, the AWT unit did a good job in debriefing this mission as a unit and identifying lessons learned specific to weapons employment, communications, and the Tactical Directive.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SIPR:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Encl
Index of Exhibits (25)

Investigating Officer

USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L 015 05/21/2019

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REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by Commander United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
(Appointing authority)

on 17 September 2010 *(Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)*
(Date)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (*investigation*) *(board)* commenced at North Kabul International Airport, ISAF/IJC *(Place)* at 2030 *(Time)*

on 17 September 2010 *(If a formal board met for more than one session, check here* ☐ *. Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.)* The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were present: *(After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)*
(Date)

See attached memorandum.

The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were absent: *(Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)*

See attached memorandum.

The *(investigating officer) (board)* finished gathering/hearing evidence at 2030 *(Time)* on 29 September 2010 *(Date)*

and completed findings and recommendations at 0800 *(Time)* on 30 September 2010 *(Date)*

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

	A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES	YES	NO1/	NA2/
1	Inclosures *(para 3-15, AR 15-6)* Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: *(Attached in order listed)*			
	a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	☒	☐	
	b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? *(See item 9, below)*	☐	☐	☒
	c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?	☐	☐	☒
	d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	☐	☐	☒
	e. Privacy Act Statements *(Certificate, if statement provided orally)?*	☒	☐	☐
	f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered *(e.g., absence of material witnesses)?*	☐	☐	☒
	g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?	☐	☐	☒
	h. Any other significant papers *(other than evidence)* relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	☒	☐	☐

FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

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		YES	NO 1/	NA 2/
2	Exhibits *(para 3-16, AR 15-6)*			
	a. Are all items offered *(whether or not received)* or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	☒	☐	☐
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	☒	☐	☐
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	☒	☐	☐
	d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions *(if substituted for real or documentary evidence)* properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	☒	☐	☐
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board *(para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?*	☒	☐	☐
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	☒	☐	☐
	g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit *(para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations *(paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS *(Chapter 5, AR 15-6)*				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment *(para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board *(para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused *(para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required *(para 3-1, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence *(para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED *(Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)*				
9	Notice to respondents *(para 5-5, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	☐	☐	
	b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	☐	☐	
	c. Does each letter of notification indicate —	☐	☐	
	(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	☐	☐	
	(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	☐	☐	
	(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	☐	☐	
	(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	☐	☐	
	(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	☐	☐	
	d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	☐	☐	
	e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	☐	☐	☐
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began *(or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):*			
	a. Was he properly notified *(para 5-5, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
	b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel *(para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
11	Counsel *(para 5-6, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?	☐	☐	
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	(If counsel is a lawyer, check here ☐ *)*			
	b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	☐	☐	☐
	c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy *(or, if oral, a summary)* of the request and the action taken on it included in the report *(para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality *(para 5-7, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	☐	☐	☐
	b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	☐	☐	☐
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to *(para 5-8a, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	☐	☐	
	b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	☐	☐	☐
	c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	☐	☐	☐
	d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	☐	☐	
	e. Testify as a witness?	☐	☐	
	f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument *(para 5-9, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses *(para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it *(para 5-11, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐

FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.
2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

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SECTION IV - FINDINGS *(para 3-10, AR 15-6)*

The *(investigating officer) (board)* , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See attached memorandum.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS *(para 3-11, AR 15-6)*

In view of the above findings, the *(investigating officer) (board)* recommends:

See attached memorandum.

Approved for release

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION *(para 3-17, AR 15-6)*

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. *(If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

_____ *(Recorder)*	_____ *(Investigating Officer) (President)*
_____ *(Member)*	_____ *(Member)*
_____ *(Member)*	_____ *(Member)*

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT *(para 3-13, AR 15-6)*

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.

(In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

_____ *(Member)*	_____ *(Member)*

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY *(para 2-3, AR 15-6)*

The findings and recommendations of the *(investigating officer) (board)* are *(approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)*

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Exhibit 1: IO Appointment Memo signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 17 September 2010

Exhibit 2: IAT executive summary addendum memo from (b)(6) dated 30 August 2010

Exhibit 3: IAT executive summary signed by (b)(6) with an environment assesment from the IAT, dated 22 August 2010.

Exhibit 4: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 5: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 6: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 7: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 8: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 9: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 10: Sworn statement w/ privacy act statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 20 September 2010

Exhibit 11: Sworn Statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) w/MFR of statement made by (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 21 September 2010

Exhibit 12: Mission De-brief provided by (b)(3), (b)(6) TF Knighthawk Commander

Exhibit 13: Imagery showing an overview of the area of the mission

Exhibit 14: AWT Screenshot showing armed insurgents

Exhibit 15: AWT Screenshot showing civilians in the area near insurgents with weapons

Exhibit 16: AWT Screenshot showing the impact areas of rounds

Exhibit 17: AC-130 Screenshot showing where rounds impact the buildings

Exhibit 18: (b)(3), (b)(6) transcript and notes from the video footage

Exhibit 19: Video recorder use and gun tape security procedures memo signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 24 November 2009.

Exhibit 20: Gun Tape editing requirements signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 13 March 2010

Exhibit 21: Recording equipment information

Exhibit 22: AH-64 Video (CD)

Exhibit 23: AC-130 Video (CD)

Exhibit 24: AH-64 Electronic Display Information

Exhibit 25: COM ISAF Tactical Directive, dtd 1 August 2010

Pages 21 through 24 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Bagram Airbase, OSJA	2010/09/20	1327	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
101st Airborne Division

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6) I am assigned to the 101st Airborne Division. I do not remember if I was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (Call sign) during the engagement in question. After looking at the video I would say that we were (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) based on the voices in the video. I do not entirely remember the situation in question. There was a point where we were engaging one man that appeared to be wounded and he was evading. We lost sight of him for a minute and then a group of women and children came into view running in a separate direction. We ceased to engage that individual because of the women and children. The S2 has a tough job and from my experience they try to paint the bleakest picture possible when they brief us prior to the mission. From the instructions that we received prior to the mission in question we were the first people to be in that area in about ten years. I cannot remember all the details but we were expecting enemy resistence. We were supporting a (b)(1)1.4d group at the time. I do not remember anything about civilians being discussed at the time of the engagement. I do not remember if were having issues with our guns on that day or not. It is typical for most aircrafts to do a kentucky-windage type burst on target and make adjustments based where your fire hits. After lookin at the video it appears that we were making adjustments based on the bursts of our ammunition. The only thing I remember was a group of women and children running past one of the guys that we were engaging. We ceased engagement when we saw the women and children. The only reason that videos are cut are to highlight the key points of during missions. This is done to avoid having four hours of video to watch and only a small portion of it shows the engagements. The videos are not cut to cover anything up. I watch the video some of the time when I am flying. Most of my focus is on the aircraft that I am flying and what is around us. On this particular mission, the terrain was somewhat restricted. I do focus on the video screen when my co-pilot/ gunner is about to engage a target. This allows me to see what he is engaging. I am not sure why I called a cease fire in the video but this is usually done just to tell the people that are firing to take their finger off the trigger. This does not necessarily mean that something went wrong. Usually every engagement is placed in the video feeds and they try to cut out the time where there is nothing going on and we are not preparing to target someone or something. I believe that we were very conservative during this mission. I cannot say that I really have any lessons learned from this. Either one of the aircraft operators can start and stop our video feeds. We get about two or three hours per cartridge and we usually keep spares so that we do not have to record over any of the other feeds. I believe that the Brigade here has a policy on preparing the cut tapes. We do not turn on the videos when we take off and land. We usually do not video tape things until we are getting close to our area of operations and we end the video when we have cleared that area. In each aircraft You have a guy in the front and the back. Usually the guy in the front operates the weapons systems and the guy in the back does most of the flying. Usually the guy in the back keeps their focus on the outside of the aircraft. Out of two aircrafts you would have two pilots in command and one pilot that is air mission commander. In a mission you also have the ground force commander with the JTAC working for him. The air mission commander has the final clearance of fires for air assets conducting the mission. During this mission we did not engage these individuals until our ground troops had communications set up. We were very conservative in this mission.

NOTHING FOLLOWS (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAB 4

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1327 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FOLLOWS. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

TAB 4

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1327 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FOLLOWS. (b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Sept, 2010 at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

INVESTIGATING OFFICER

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TAB 4

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)		20SEP10
Printed Name/Rank	Signature	Date

TAB 4

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AIRBASE	2010/09/20	1450	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

TASK FORCE NIGHTHAWK , B COMPANY, 1-3 ATTACK

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am scheduled to fly approximately four to five days a week. On the mission in question I do not remember if I was call sign (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), After looking at the video I can say that I was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the gunner on this mission. I have already made a sworn statement about the mission in question. We make a sworn statement for every engagement that we have. A copy of that statement and the tape goes up through the chain of command. For this mission we went in to provide a (b)(1)1.4a call and overhead security. I was trying to relay to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), the JTAC, that we noticed a group of indivuals with RPGs and small to medium machine guns exiting a kulat with line of sight on the HLZ. I was not able to communicate with the JTAC at the time. Concerning the armed individuals exiting the kulat with line of sight on the HLZ - (b)(1)1.4a AWT directed which aircraft would follow which personnel and the AWT incorporated (b)(1)1.4a into this effort as well. Ultimately, upon establishing communications with (b)(1)1.4a element (b)(1)1.4a were cleared to make engagements of some of the armed personnel who exited the previously stated kulat with line of sight on the HLZ. I do not recall any mission brief about women and children being in the area. . We do not go into complete detail on ROE prior to every mission but all of our guys understand the Rules of Engagement. Both aircraft provided effective fires with adjustment. After mission with engagement we sit down with the video editors to point out at which times the engagements take place. We help them label the amount of rounds fired and who they were fired by. The editor does all of the editing of the tape after we have gone through it with them. (b)(6) was one of the people mentioned in the video. He was the pilot in command and he was in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) with me. We have six aircrafts available and each have their own call sign. I am scheduled to fly approximately 4 to 5 times in a week. We are the division QRF team so our flights are situation dependent. This month I probably have about 30-40 hours in twenty days. I have had one hour flights and my longest was 10.2 hours long. On average I fly about 50-60 hours a month.

----------NOTH (b)(3), (b)(6) LLOWS----------

TAB 5

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) KING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1450 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 1----------

Approved for Release

TAb 5

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1450 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT E(b)(3), (b)(6)AGE 1----------

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY W THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Su law to administer oaths, this 20 day of SEPT, 2010 at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INVESTIGATING OFFICER

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TAB S

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Date

TAB 5

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AIRBASE	2010/09/20	1650	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

TF KNIGHTHAWK, 2-3 AVN REG, BAF, AF, APO AE 09354

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6) for the mission in question. As the (b)(6) (b)(6) I was in Chalk 1 of UH-60'S in charge of emplacing the Command and Control Cell for the ground force. Before we went in we received a detail brief from the S-2. This brief talks about the patterns of life in this area. This along with other information gives us a pretty good idea of what we are going to see when we get there. It was a clear night and we had good situational awareness. We also had a good line of communication. Most the time I am looking outside on the NVGs. We always focus on possible civilians in an area. There are occasions where we are told that the Taliban has driven everyone out. In this case we knew there were civilians in area and that we had to be cautious with fires. We also knew that there would be enemies in the area and that there was a chance of a fire fight. If we suspect that there is collateral damage during a mission we will have them keep the copy of the whole tape. In this case we believed that there was not any collateral damage to any structures other than the impacts against the qalat wall. After seeing the AC-130 video, I want to state that is the first time that I have seen any rounds hit center mass on any of the buildings. I knew that we had hit next to the qalat and hit the qalat wall but I was not aware that any of our rounds hit the center of the roof of those buildings. When we edit our videos we try to focus on the lead up to the engagement and the engagement itself. We also try to show any build up of enemy activity that poses a threat to our Soldiers. To re-emphasize, we did not think that there was any reason to keep the entire video in this mission. If I saw the rounds hit those roofs we would have kept the entire videos. There is not enough communication between the AC-130s and our guys. If we were recieving feedback from their tapes from them we could have made adjustments after finding out that we had hit that building. My attack company has become much better at harmonizing our guns. It is a very lengthy process but we are doing this at least weekly. (b)(3), (b)(6) was re-trained after this mission so that he understands how important it is for him to pay attention to all the alerts on his screen including the laser fail and energy low cautions. This situation could have been better if the gunner had gone into manual mode and made more adjustments to his fire. There was nothing necessarily wrong with what (b)(3), (b)(6) did but he definitely could have done things a little better. This was seen as an okay shoot but a poor engagement. This tape was played in front of the entire troop and used as a lesson learned for better engagements WRT the tactical directive and better gunnery skills when the gun system is not 100% operational. We continue to learn from all of our engagements supporting ground forces in RC-East.

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS (b)(3), (b)(6) ----------

TAB 6

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6)	NG STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1650 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE ----------

Approved for Release

TAB 6

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1650 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE (b)(3), (b)(6) ----------

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Sept, 2010 at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INVESTIGATING OFFICER

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TAB 6

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

20 SEP 10
Date

TAB 6

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AIRBASE	2010/09/20	1745	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC 2/3 TF KNIGHTHAWK

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I work in the TOC. I deal with the tapes of Appache engagements. Any time I deal with tape I have a pilot there with me explaining what is going on in the video. We usually take 3-5 hours of footage and break it down to 10 minutes. I trained with one of the other units that has alot of experience in the field. I trained for a couple of days. Usually the pilots take the hard drives out of the Appaches and gives the tapes directly to me. The tape is edited immediately after the crew returns from their engagement. You do not download the RMM. I cut the big parts out of the tape and put it into the Adobe Premier program and then download it from there. We usually do not keep all of the footage. I have had situations where they tell me to keep all of the tapes if there were any descrepencies during the engagement. I was not told to leave anything out of the tape in question. I edited this tape the same way that I would do any other tape. I go throught the RMM with the pilots and pull the times that they specify were specific to the engagement. I always pull the information from five minutes before and five minutes after the times that they give me. This is how I try to make sure that I do not miss anything that could be important. I have never been told to specifically leave anything out of any video. The pilots were concerned that they were danger close to the collats in this engagement. I did not intentionally pull the audio out that referenced there being a female there. I did not feel like there was anything wrong with this particular engagement. (b)(3), (b)(6) always goes through the tapes with me and assists me with the tapes and to make sure that everything is okay with the videos. The video stays in the editing mode until (b)(3), (b)(6) sees it. There are usually only minor changes that I am asked to make to the videos. These changes usually include spelling errors and me leaving too much footage on the tapes. There are some parts that they will tell me to cut out if I leave footage that is not needed in the video. I do not think that anyone asked me to cut out the part where they mention a female on the audio feed. The videos stay in edit mode until it goes through (b)(3), (b)(6) I would not cut out that part of the video usually. I do not remember cutting out that portion of the video. It seems like a fast cut and I would not usually cut the audio in mid sentence except if there is cursing. (b)(3), (b)(6) will sometimes make cuts to the video but he usually does that when I am present. It is possible that someone got on the computer and made additional cuts to the video without my knowledge but I am not aware of anyone doing that. There are a few people that have access to the computer that the editing is done on. These people and myself know the log in information for the computer that the video editing is done on. The program that I work on saves the file every ten to fifteen minutes. If the night person edited this video it would have been edited at night. My edits would usually be done through the day. I was called in early to edit this video.

----------NOTHING FO (b)(3), (b)(6) ----------

TAB 7

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6) MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1745 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

TAB 7

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1745 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, O

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Sept 2010 at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Investigating Officer

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TAB 7

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)	9/20/19
Printed Name/Rank Signature	Date

TAB 7

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AIRBASE	2010/09/20	2100	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Bravo Company, 1st BN, 3rd Aviation Regiment, TF Knighthawk, TF Falcon, CJTF-101, RC-East

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

We have Specialists (2 x E4s) that do all of our video editing for us and they have nothing to do with aviation. They are radio operators and TOC personnel. I was not actually on the mission in question. During the month of August we were supporting ANA DUSTWUN operations during the day insupport of TF Iron Gray in Metherlam Providence. We were supporting operations of 1 AWT day and 2 x AWTs a night for 2 months. The maintenance on the aircraft was as through as possible in order to support all the required missions. We have 6 aircraft here at BAF, one is always in major maintenance and that leaves 5 (best case) to support the missions. The same aircraft that are being flown at night are also flown during the day so we run into some maintanance issues with the aircrafts. This was effecting all systems on the aircraft that were on the mission in question. I assisted cutting the video on this as I was on day shift and in the CP without a launch mission at that time. I do not remember hearing anything about a female in the area. We did not intentionally cut anything out of this video it protects us as much as it does anyone else. The video actually protects our guys because you can see what is going on when we are on mission. I sit here with the video editors as much as possible to help cut videos and to help listen for the most important items as in key radio calls regarding PID, ROE, clearance of fire and any thing else of important. I believe that we also had an engagement on the day of the mission in question. These videos go all the way up to Lieutenant General Campbell (RC-East CDR). The videos are reviewed by myself up through (b)(3), (b)(6) and so on. We used this mission as a lessoned learned by taking our weapons systems in to account and how to adjust them. We tried to look at some of the things that could be done when crews are having issues with their weapons as well as effectively employment the aircraft in the channelizing terrain. We as a crew talked through the tapes of this and another engagement that we had prior to this one. The tactical directive indicates that civilian casualties are more important to the overall US mission than getting insurgency. We have to be very careful when dealing with civilians in the area. There are multiple ways to adjust the weapon when you are on mission. You have to make adjustments based on the rounds that you are putting down. We have a pretty young crew here and most of them are still gaining experience. I was coming in on day shift on the day that these guys returned from the mission in question. I talked to the guys and there were alot of concerns. The men on this mission said that their biggest issue was communications. There were many other concerns such as weather. They were not familiar with the area because we had conducted any missions in the area. The AH-64 employs a VHF, UHF, FM1, FM2, SATCOM as well as intercom with your opposite crew member. Crews break up radio coverage between aircraft to ensure that all required radios are answered. However when too many radios are in operation many times crews will turn down certain radios in order to better hear certain radio calls. The video recorder will record all radios at the same time and many times the calls will not be understood by the crews nor the video editor.

----------NOT (b)(3), (b)(6) LLOWS----------

TAB 8

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2100 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMEN (b)(3), (b)(6) N PAGE 1----------

Approved for Release

TAB 8

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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APD PE v1.00

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2100 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Sub admin law to 2010

at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Investigating Officer

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

TAB B

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

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~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

20Sept10.
Date

TAB 8

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NZL~~

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Bagram Air Base	2010/09/20	1558	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am the (b)(3), (b)(6) The boss and I and I put out standards for flight crews. We have given guidance that all flight crews involved in an engagement will record the engagement. We have also put out guidance on how the tapes should be edited. We are very clear in our instructions to the battalion about how these tapes are edited. The aircraft has 2 six GB Hard Drives (RMM) that record a little more that four hours of tape. The insrtuctions put out are that if there are any trigger pulls while on mission, the tape must be brought in for editing. For the tape in question, we were not asked for the whole tape until two more days later. At this point the film had already been recorded over and all we had was the edited version. The edited tape that was provided for the mission in question was the tape that edited for the mission. This tape was not specifically edited for the Incident Assesment Team. There are always two RMMs per aircraft but one recording system. I would say that about 3.75 hours of the video in question was cut out. There is alot of audio that just involves the specifics of the party involved. The footage is edited for someone to quickly look at the tapes. We include all of the information from the actual engagements, including target hand-offs and engagement clearance. The video editing is done by video editors that we train. The editing is not done by the air crew. The air crew will debrief the editors and the video editors make the cuts to the video. We do not have a requirement for the air crew to make a sworn statement but they are required to give a debrief after the mission. There is no theater guidance in regards to what happens after engagement.

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

TAB 9

10. EXHIBIT	11. INIT (b)(3), (b)(6) N MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1558 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

Approved for Release

TAB 9

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1558 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY [redacted] WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU[redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Sept, 2010 at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Investigating Officer

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TAB 9

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING S (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

20 SEP 10
Date

TAB 9

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AIRBASE	2010/09/20	2000	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

B co 1-3 Atk

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was (b)(3), (b)(6) on the night of the mission. I believe that I was call sign 1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). When we see two to three people with weapons we would label the area as LZ Cherry. When we arrived at the scene six or seven people ran out of the house with weapons. We did not have communications with the ground unit. We did not receive coms with the ground, so we called (b)(3), (b)(6) for clearance to fire. We could not get clearance to fire so we kept on flying until we made communication with the ground. I believe that the original video shown is of the first two individuals that ran from the house. We engaged the two on the mountain. I believe that we got one of the guys on the hill and the other one made it down the hill vicinity the buildings. The way the mission was presented to us was that we were the first people to enter this area in about ten years. When we arrived there was only one individual on or around one of the buildings but after a while we got eyes on about six or seven of them. We left to refuel and while we were gone one of the ground unit guys was shot. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6) was the one that responded to retrieve the injured person out of the objective. We were constantly trying to pass information to the ground unit that they had one individual that seemed to be following them but we were unable to reach them. When the engagement was over we did see an individual come out of his home with a kid following him. We were not aware of any children and woman in the area until after the engagement. I was in the back seat of the aircraft. My gunner was requesting to engage at one point in the video but I told him not to engage because there were friendlies in the area. At one point in the engagement me and the other aircraft split because there was alot of activity in the area. We tried to have eyes on everything that was going on at the time. I did not know that rounds hit the top of the building as shown in the AC-130 video. I believe that one of our biggest lessons learned from this situation was that we needed to ensure that communications was set up. As soon as CH47 landed and dropped off ground forces there were people with RPGs and other weapons on the scene. With the restrictions placed on us by ROE and the Tactical Directive, we have to be very cautious as to what weapons we use. If we had tried to fire a hell fire we would have overstepped our boundaries at the time. We continued to fire the guns because they were the most fitting weapons for the situation. It is very different to watch the video now from the AC-130 video because he was not in that valley. It was pretty crazy in the valley. I turned the tapes in like I usually would after this mission. There was nothing done differently outside of our typical procedures after mission.

(b)(3), (b)(6) NOTHING FOLLOWS (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAB 10

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 — DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE — APD PE v1.00

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2000 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

TAB 10

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2000 DATED 2010/09/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIO CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREEL THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Sept 2010 at Bagram AB, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Investigating Officer

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TAB 10

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

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Having been advised of the provisio [redacted] provide information concerning this investig

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Printed Name/Rank

20 Sep 10

Date

TAB 10

Approved for release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
TELPHONIC FROM IJC LEGAD OFFICE	2010/09/21	1945	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

B CO 1-3 AHB, 3 CAB

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

We arrived on the scene and Positively Identified (PID) the individuals on the ground. We saw the men pulling weapons out of a building but there were friendlies in the area so we could not shoot at the time. I cannot remember exactly what call sign I was that night. We could not reach the men on the ground through radio communications. I shot two bursts with the 30mm weapon on the armed unfriendly individuals coming down the hill. I remember that my gun was off. It was not firing as it was advertised on the screen. I was not aware of any civilians in the area but we knew that there were qalats in the area. My biggest concern was the friendly forces on the ground. At one point they were about twenty meters from the enemy. When I fired the friendly forces were at least 100 meters away. The individual that I fired at may have been about 75 meters from the buildings below the hill. The individual that I fired on was a threat to our forces on the ground because he had a weapon and he was setting up in a tactical position to fire on the forces on the ground. I did not feel any pressure from my pilot to fire my weapon. Everything worked like it normally would except the fact that I would have chosen to fire the hellfire while the guys were on the side of the mountain. People in Afghanistan are very cautious about firing hellfire weapons. We received extensive briefings on the types of weapons used after the mission. The reality of that night was that if we would have waited any longer to fire we would have lost PID on that guy. The terrain in that area is very rough and tough to navigate, especially at night. The radios were a problem that night. Our communications were very bad. We had multiple aircraft in the pattern and our radios kept getting locked out. Once the C-130 opens the radio frequency we are blocked out for about 10 seconds. The communications were the biggest problem that evening. There were multiple times that we could have engaged but did not because we exercised tactical patience. Due to this, there was a friendly troop shot that night. My mission is to take out the enemy threat and to make sure that I protect our Soldiers. The tactical directive was followed as I understand it, we did not intentially engage any dwellings, caves or any places where civilians may have been present. I would say that the one lesson learned from this is to slow down a little bit but there is rarely a mission that allows that. We were able to clear our own fires in Iraq. I think if that was the case in Afghanistan this could have all been avoided. I think if we could stream line the process for clearance of fire we would not be in this situation right now.

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

TAB 11

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1940 DATED 2010/09/21

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

Approved for Release

TAB 11

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------STATEMENT ENDS ON PAGE 1----------

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

_____

_____

_____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____

_____

_____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____

at _____

_____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

Thb 11

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	(b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

ISAF/IJC 21 September 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Knighthawk, B Company, 1-3 Attack) Interview

1. On 21 September 2010, I interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) via telephone regarding the AR 15-6 investigation surrounding the events in Tigiran Village on 22 August 2010. I administered the oath prior to conducting the interview.

2. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that they arrived on scene and positively identified (PID) insurgents on the ground. They saw men pulling weapons out of a building, but there were friendlies in the area so they could not shoot at the time. They could not reach the friendlies on the ground through radio communications. Later, they engaged an armed insurgent coming down a hill. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his gun was off and not firing as advertised. He was not aware of any civilians in the area, but was aware of qalats in the area. His biggest concern was the friendly forces on the ground and their close proximity to the enemy. (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that the individual he fired on was a threat to friendly forces, because he had a weapon and was setting up in a tactical position to fire on the friendly forces on the ground. He stated that he did not feel any pressure from his pilot to fire his weapon. If they had waited any longer, then they would have lost PID on the insurgent. He was not aware that any of the rounds impacted the qalats in the area.

(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that terrain in the area was very rough and tough to navigate, especially at night. The radios were also a problem that night. There were multiple aircraft in the area and the radios kept getting locked out due to multiple communication issues.

(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that they received extensive briefings on weapons employment after the mission. He also expressed concern that the Tactical Directive needs to be clearer. He also stated that the lesson learned from the night was to slow down a little bit if possible, but that there is rarely a mission that allows that.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SIPR:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

TAR 11

FILL OUT ALL YELLOW AREAS THAT APPLY

TASK FORCE KNIGHTHAWK PILOT DEBRIEFING

DTG:	20100821	MSN # / Name	OP (b)(1)1.4a	UNIT	Bco 1-3	ISO:	
Mission Start Time (Z)	2311	Mission End Time (Z)	0555	Route			
AMC:	(b)(3), (b)(6)						

PC #1 / PI #1	(b)(3), (b)(6)	CS	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)	Tail#	360	D		N		NVG		Other		Total:	0.0
PC #2 / PI #2		CS		Tail#	306	D		N		NVG		Other		Total:	0.0
PC #3 / PI #3		CS		Tail#		D		N		NVG		Other		Total:	
PC #4 / PI #4		CS		Tail#		D		N		NVG		Other		Total:	

HOURS

MSN SUMMARY

Location	Passengers D/O	Passengers P/U	Cargo D/O	Cargo P/U	Time ARR	Time DEP	LZ/PZ Control Remarks
TOTAL:	0	0	0	0			

AMRs

COMPLETED AMRs			UNCOMPLETED AMRs		

NAI RECONNAISSANCE

NAI	START TIME	STOP TIME	ACTIVITY OBSERVED

Ammunition

Type	Training	Combat
30MM		
2.75 PD		
2.75 RC		
2.75 IL		
2.75 IR		
2.75 WP		
HELLFIRE		
.50 CAL		
7.62		

Did you accomplish the mission?			Yes	X	No		Flares by Type	M206	M211	M212
If not, why?	WX	Maintenance								
CXL'd by Knighthawk		CXL'd by requesting unit					Maintenance Posture			
Other							Close out w/PC		HUMS	

ENEMY ACTIVITY / THREATS ENCOUNTERED

Weapons/Equipment		SAFIRE		Bunkers		Fighting Positions	
Mine Field		Demonstration		Military Activity		Suspicious Activity	
Possible IED		Fire		Illegal Activity		Other	
Was a threat encountered?	Yes*	No	Type			DTG:	
Grid:		Action Taken:					
Did you record any incidents?		Yes		No		DTG:	
Grid:		Aircraft Video Recorder				Digital Camera	
Was a SPOT report sent?		Yes		No		DTG:	
To Whom				Grid:			
Did You Receive any APR 39 or CMWS Warnings?		Yes		No		DTG:	
Grid:		Indication:		Direction:		Altitude:	
Did You Receive any Electronic Interference? (MIJI)		Yes		No	Type	DTG:	

BDA

Enemy Fighters		Vehicles		Infrastructure	

MISSION NARRATIVE:

TAB 12
pg 1 of 4

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

Departed BAF at 2311 IOT to support Operation (b)(1)1.4a. Objective was to infil (b)(1)1.4d forces into 3 x HLZs (HLZ Crane, HLZ Heron, HLZ Vulture) IOT to detain two personnel. We arrived over the HLZs / Objective areas at 0022 and assessed all HLZs – the ICE call was relayed and the first CH 47 approached into HLZ Heron. At this time (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) are in direct communication with each other and begin inspecting the immediate areas surrounding the HLZ. (b)(1)1.4a are unsuccessful with establishing communications with the GFC (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) AC. While inspecting the area around HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) identified 5 x pax exiting a kulat wi 200m of HLZ Heron all of which had weapons and were obviously in close proximity of the HLZ. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) right repeatedly attempted to rally (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a successfully. As the 5 x armed personnel egressed from the house (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) AWT divided efforts and monitored all personnel. Established communications with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) and reported all of the current intel (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) approved immediate attacks provided that weapons could be (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged 2 x pax vic VD 2174 9216 with 30mm – 2 x EKIA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged 1 x pax vic _VD 2191 9275 1 x EKIA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged another burst of 30mm on the same pax with no apparent effect on the individual and did not attempt another burst as he had moved closer to the village / CDE concerns. (b)(1)1.4a continued surveillance on the surrounding areas identifying multiple individuals moving around tactically and bounding behind terrain for cover (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) PID pax on a mountain face and engaged with 40mm. In addition (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) fired on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) fired ONE x FA Hellfire missile vic VD 2371 9001 ele 9583 - 1 X EKIA. Upon completing this engagement all assets continued with looking for threats (b)(1)1.4a AWT identified 3 x armed pax walking down a road vic VD 2267 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged one burst of 30mm (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) fired a subsequent burst of 30mm – 1 X EKIA. Continued with surveillance and overhead security until an extraction was arranged. It is unknown as to whether or not the 2 x pax that the (b)(1)1.4d forces desired to detain were ever secured.

INTERNAL AAR COMMENTS (TF KNIGHTHAWK RELATED)

There were several occasion when the INS had closed to within hand grenade range of coalition troops. Spotty commo and proximity to friendlies made engagements impossible. We chose not to engage on at least 5 targets that we were cleared to engage based on the "tactical directive". During the brief it was stated that anyone leaving the objective was declared hostile. The crews felt a highten sense of urgency due to the sheer volume of pax fleeing the objective and the challenges of maintaining continuous PID due to terrain restrictions. I felt the use of the AC-130 assisting in PID and engagements and BDA was invaluable.

PERSON TAKING DEBRIEF	
PERSON(S) DEBRIEFED	

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

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TAB 12
pg 2 of 4

FILL OUT ALL YELLOW AREAS THAT APPLY

TASK FORCE KNIGHTHAWK PILOT DEBRIEFING

DTG:	22 0600 AUG 10	MSN # / Name	OP (b)(1)1.4a	UNIT	TF 81 NZ	ISO:	NZ SOF
Misson Start Time (Z)		1610Z	Mission End Time (Z)	0045Z	Route		
AMC:		(b)(3), (b)(6)					

HOURS

PC #1 / PI #1	(b)(3), (b)(6)	CS	MSV 53	Tail#	157	D		N	0.8	NVG	4.8	Other		Total:	5.6
PC #2 / PI #2		CS	MSV 55	Tail#	175	D		N	0.8	NVG	4.8	Other		Total:	5.6
PC #3 / PI #3		CS	ASLT 51	Tail#	478	D		N	0.4	NVG	5.1	Other		Total:	5.5
PC #4 / PI #4		CS	ASLT77	Tail#	071	D		N	0.5	NVG	5.2	Other		Total:	5.7

MSN SUMMARY

Location	Passengers D/O	Passengers P/U	Cargo D/O	Cargo P/U	Time ARR	Time DEP	LZ/PZ Control Remarks
BAF						2150	
WAREHOUSE		52			2210	2220	
BAF	52	52			2248	2240	
OBJECTIVE	52				0035	0045	
BAMYAN					0110	0305	
OBJECTIVE		52			0330	0340	
BAMYAN		18			0405	0425	
WAREHOUSE	52				0500	0505	
BAF	18				0525		
TOTAL:	174	174	0	0			

AMRs

COMPLETED AMRs				UNCOMPLETED AMRs			

NAI RECONNAISSANCE

NAI	START TIME	STOP TIME	ACTIVITY OBSERVED

Ammunition

Type	Training	Combat
30MM		300
2.75 PD		
2.75 RC		
2.75 IL		
2.75 IR		
2.75 WP		
HELLFIRE		1
.50 CAL		
7.62		

Did you accomplish the mission?			Yes		No		Flares by Type	M206		M211		M212	
If not, why?	WX		Maintenance										
CXL'd by Knighthawk			CXL'd by requesting unit				Maintenance Posture						
Other							Close out w/PC			HUMS			

ENEMY ACTIVITY / THREATS ENCOUNTERED

Weapons/Equipment	X	SAFIRE		Bunkers		Fighting Positions					
Mine Field		Demonstration		Military Activity		Suspicious Activity		X			
Possible IED		Fire		Illegal Activity		Other					
Was a threat encountered?	Yes*	X	No	Type	7 X MAMs WITH WPNS	DTG:					
Grid:		Action Taken:		ENGAGED AND KILLED BY 30MM AWT							
Did you record any incidents?		Yes		No		DTG:					
Grid:		Aircraft Video Recorder				Digital Camera					
Was a SPOT report sent?			Yes	X	No		DTG:				
To Whom					Grid:						
Did You Receive any APR 39 or CMWS Warnings?			Yes		No		DTG:				
Grid:		Indication:			Direction:		Altitude:				
Did You Receive any Electronic Interference? (MIJI)			Yes		No	Type		DTG:			

BDA

Enemy Fighters		Vehicles		Infrastructure	

MISSION NARRATIVE:

LOTS OF MISSION CHANGES AFTER KH PLANS WALKED IN:
- MOVED THE MORGAN QRF TO BAMYAN PRT VIA KH QRF UH60s IN THE MIDDLE OF THE AFTERNOON
- TF 81 REQUESTED NO ONE GO TO BAMYAN PRT PRIOR TO INSERT
- CH47s PICKED UP PAX AT WAREHOUSE AND BROUGHT THEM TO BAF FOR COLD LOAD TRAINING AND LEADER L/U

GUN, HOOK, AND LIFT ELEMENTS ALL DEPARTED ON TIME FOR THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
(b)(1)1.4a FLIGHT UPON ARRIVAL FOUND THE AREA TO HAVE NUMEROUS MAMs IN THE AO AND THEY COULD PID WEAPONS, (b)(1)1.4a (AC-130) ALSO SPOTTED MAMs WITH WEAPONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
THE FIRST CHALK OF CH47s INFILLED TO HERON BUT CHALK 2 WAS WAVED OFF AT THE "CHERRY" CALL.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) WERE ON THE AMC AIRCRAFT AND GAVE CLEARANCE TO FIRE ON MAMs WITH WEAPONS WHO WERE MOVING TACTICALLY/SUSPICIOUSLY AROUND THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
AFTER ENGAGING WITH 30MM AND 40MM (AC-130) THE SECOND CHALK OF CH47 WAS INSERTED TO HERON AND THE C2 TEAM WAS INSERTED INTO VULTURE, BUT AT A DIFFERENT T/D POINT, THE ORIGINAL WAS UNTENABLE. LIFT 2 INSERTED THE ARF INTO HERON, NO ISSUE.
WE BEGAN REFUEL OPS WITH 2 X UH SINCE THE AWT WAS STILL ENGAGING AND IDing ENEMY FORCES AROUND THE OBJ AREA.
THE AWT SOON FOLLOWED TO BAMYAN FOR REFUEL, LEAVING THE AC-130 OVERHEAD. UPON FINISHING REFUEL, WE GOT A CALL TO GO BACK TO THE HLZ FOR A CASEVAC (b)(1)1.4a GUNSHOT WOUND). THE FIRST FUELED AH DEPARTED WITH THE AMC . WE PICKED UP THE PATIENT VIC (b)(1)1.4a AND HEADED BACK TOWARDS BAMYAN AND PICKED UP LIFT 2 FOR ESCORT SO GUN 2 COULD LINK UP WITH GUN 1 OVER THE OBJECTIVE. THE TF 81 TEAM DID NOT CALL FOR MEDEVAC UNTIL LATER.
WE GOT THE CALL FOR EXFIL ABOUT 0300 (AS PLANNED) AND FINISHED REFUEL OPS FOR A 0330L PICK UP AT HERON AND VULTURE.
WE HEADED BACK NORTH CH AND UH TO PROVIDE SEPARATION INTO HERON. EXFIL WENT FINE AND THE C2 TEAM MOVED BACK TO THEIR DROP OFF POINT ON VULTURE. WE GOT THE PZ CLEAN CALL AND ALL HEADED TO BAMYAN FOR NZ CONSOLIDATION ON THE CH47 AND TF MORGAN TO THE 2 X UH60s. DEPARTED FOR WAREHOUSE/BAF (CH) AND BAF (UH AND AH).
END OF MISSION.
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) **WILL PREP DEBRIEF AND GUN TAPE FOR THEIR ENGAGEMENTS.**
BDA- 7 X KIA, 300+ROUNDS OF 30MM AND 1 X FA MODEL HELLFIRE

PERSON TAKING DEBRIEF	
PERSON(S) DEBRIEFED	(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Armed INS Exiting Building (AH-64 WSV)

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~



Women and Children Moving From One Building to Another (AH-64 WSV)



3rd AWT Gun Pass (AH-64 WSV)

Angry 22/20:35.138Z



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NZL~~

USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L

3nd AWT Gun Pass (AC-130 WSV)



TRANSCRIPT – ~~SECRET~~

20:34:32 All parties involved, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) has one more target, one more military aged male with a weapon at the previous engaged grid, will be engaging shortly.

20:34:47 (b)(1)1.4a

20:34:49 From (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6), can you relay that last message.

20:34:55 Slasher 02. (b)(1)1.4a, they're going to be re-engaging one more enemy mover with a PID'd weapon. How copy?

20:35:06 From (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) That's a good copy, (b)(1)1.4a cleared to engage.

20:35:26 This is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) we [cleared to engage] have five [yeah, he's limping] non-friendly personnel [cleared to engage] next to a building approximately 200 meters (Firing - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) 1st pass) in front of your ground patrol, the ground patrol is moving toward the people, huddled by the building, at least one is female. (Note: AWT video/audio ends at 20:35:40 with the word building and then jumps to 20:35:52, the words at least one is female is not on the video provided by AWT).

20:35:51 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) copies.

20:35:54 From (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) That guys right here they want to shoot, they just shot at him and missed. Got him in sight? Yep. I need to make an adjustment though. Okay. What weapon? I can hit him with a hellfire. Shoot. Shoot. (20:36:01 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) starts transmitting in the background) No hellfire. Shoot. Firing (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) 1st pass at 20:36:03 – miss, impacts are long, do not appear to hit huddled group, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) 2nd pass 20:36:09, rounds appear to impact roofs of buildings next to huddled group, but not group itself.) Yeah, got to adjust. Did you get him? Cease fire.

20:36:01: From (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) All parties involved, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) tried to engage that last guy again, he is wounded and he's making his way toward the five personnel huddled against the qalat wall that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned. Stand-by for grid, VD (b)(1)1.4a. I say again, VD (b)(1)1.4a. One enemy confirmed armed, however, he's got CDE issues surrounding him now (transmission ends at 20:36:39).

20:36:44 From (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) looks like personnel are all at this compound right here, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) copies, looking, we got those personnel that he's going near. Yeah, there's like 20 of them, 20 of them (this group appears to be the same huddled group, moving along the edge of the building, and possibly more personnel coming out of the building – same building that rounds just landed on top of).

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FALCON 6 SENDS

MESSAGE 09-02

24 NOV 09

SUBJECT: Video Recorder Use and Gun Tape Security Procedures

1. AH-64D and OH-58D aircrews will utilize their respective video recording system during mission execution. When OH-58D aircrews are not using the MMS as the active line-of-sight, it will be fixed forward with FLIR selected, to serve as a basic flight data/audio recorder.

2. Following any significant event or any weapons engagement recorded on the OH-58D VRS, AH-64D RMM or a hand-held video recorder, the Air Mission Commander will , immediately upon landing, secure the tape/hard drive from each Pilot-In-Command and without delay, turn in tapes/hard drives to the Task Force S-2, Battle Captain, S-3 or TF Commander.

3. The Commander, Task Force Falcon, is the sole release authority of a video event, to include requests from higher headquarters. Release of footage without the express consent of Commander, Task Force Falcon, will result in punishment under UCMJ.

4. This Message will be posted in the AIRF. POC is (b)(3), (b)(6)

OFFICIAL

//(b)(3), (b)(6)//

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TAB 19

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, NZL~~

FALCON 6 SENDS

MESSAGE 09-06 **13 MAR 10**

SUBJECT: Gun Tape Editing Requirements

1. References: Falcon 6 Sends Message 09-02 Video Recorder Use and Gun Tape Security Requirements.

2. Purpose. This message establishes standards for Gun Tape editing for all units assigned or otherwise attached to Task Force Falcon.

3. Ready-To-Launch Criteria. At least one aircraft in a flight of two-ship AH or OH flight will have an operation video recording system. If the flight is a "purple team" or a other type flight with only one AH or OH, it will have an operational video recording system.

4. All engagements for AH and OH aircraft will be recorded, including test fires and warning shots. If there is only one operational video recording system (VRS/RMM) operational in the flight, the team will, *if tactically feasible*, have the aircraft with the operational VRS engage the target, or, film the other aircraft engaging. Tapes of engagements can be used to promote a positive message by providing evidence of the professionalism of our pilots. If in the editing process, valuable footage is left out, the tapes can present the wrong story and be harmful to the overall I/O campaign of USFOR-A. Crews are reminded to "talk to the tape" and help build the scenario.

5. The edited tape will include *all* trigger pulls pertinent to the engagement by *both* aircrews. The edited tape will be in the following format:

a. Lead-In Slide with BN Task Force Logo. Describes overall summary of engagement. Example: "Pistol 34/35 Engage AAF IVO COP Mace, XD 4252 7968." Slide fades into Map Slide, showing a progressively zoomed map until a Falcon View photo of area is reached.

b. Talk-On Slide. Describes how aircrew received mission and arrived at engagement area. Example: " Yukon 52 is ambushed by AAF on Route Florida. Requests CCA from Cobra 15/16"

c. Video excerpt of talk-on and/or aircrew's discovery of target.

d. PID Slide. Describes how aircrew establishes PID. Example: "Pistol 34/35 observe 10 MAM with hot-barreled weapons maneuvering IVO ambush site"

e. Video excerpt of aircrew working through PID with GFC or with AMC if no GFC involved.

f. Clearance of Fires Slide. Describes who gives aircrew clearance to engage. Include video/audio excerpts with aircrew utilizing the FALCON GUN TAPE VERBAGE kneeboard guide.

g. Video excerpt of clearance to fire and engagement.

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h. BDA Slide. Describes BDA and verbage from aircrew that no collateral or civilian casualties were observed.

i. Video excerpt from paragraph h.

6. The edited tape will be forwarded to the Commander, Task Force Falcon within 2 hours of the aircrews arrival at homestation.

7. This Message will be posted in the AIRF. POC is (b)(3), (b)(6)

OFFICIAL
// (b)(3), (b)(6) //

Attachment FALCON GUN TAPE VIDEO Guide

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MDR-80

GOODRICH

Key Benefits

- Upgrade and expansion without hardware modification
- Flexible configurations via plug-in application cards
- Up to six (6) channels of video recording
- Solid state removable memory module (RMM) interfaces directly to ground debriefing station via industry standard interface

General Specifications

Video	
Video Signal Standard	EIA RS-170 or NTSC; CCIR (PAL)
Horizontal Resolution	500-TVL nominal (selectable by bit rate)
Linearity	10 gray scale or better
S-to-Noise Ratio	Better than 43dB
Input Options	Composite, Y/C and RGB
Outputs Options	Composite, Y/C and RGB

Audio	
Input Level	0.9Vpp nominal, (-10dBV)
Input Impedance	10K ohm
Output Level	0.9Vpp (47K ohm load)
Bandwidth	50Hz to 15KHz
Signal-to-Noise Ratio	Better than 40dB

Power	
Requirement	28VDC (+4V, -8V) unregulated, MIL-STD-704A, MIL-STD-704D, MIL-STD-704E
Consumption	35 watts nominal at 28VDC

Size / Dimensions	
Weight	7.6 lbs. (3.5kg) Nominal
Dimensions	5.9 in. W x 4.8 in. H x 6.4 in. D*

* Excludes connectors and handles

Operational Position Installation

Any Direction, vertically or horizontally, four ways.
Tray mount Dzus-rail mounts available.

Connectors

Power	Bendix PT02E-10-6P type
Control and Signal	Bendix PT02E-18-32P type

(Optional MIL-C-38999, Series 3 connectors available)

Product Features

- Basic unit–single channel video—add-ons include additional video channels, 1553, video image capture, "smart" control and mission loading
- Support of the V-80 serial I/O communication protocol
- Simultaneous record and playback
- MPEG-2 video compression; selectable bit rates
- Dynamic modification of video / audio encoding bit rates
- User and/or aircraft controls via the high- or low-speed data bus (es)—Discrete, RS422, 1553, Ethernet
- Multiple RMM configurations available
- Industry standard processor architecture and operating system ensure long-term supportability
- 10/100/1000 Base T Ethernet

User Application Cards

- MPEG-2 video, 1 and 2 channels
- 1553 recording, up to 4 channels
- PCM recording, up to 3 channels
- RGB scan converter

TEAC Aerospace Technologies
Now part of Goodrich Corporation.

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RMM-IU80

TEAC
AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGIES

Removable Memory Module Interface Unit (RMM-IU80)

Model 50580401-005

The TEAC MDR-80 Digital Mission Data Recorder records the mission video and data on a Removable Memory Module (RMM). Two types of RMM's are used: hard disk drive RMM and solid state RMM; depending on customer requirements and aircraft environments. The RMM-IU80 is the Interface Unit, or docking station, used to interface the RMM to the debriefing computer.

The RMM-IU80 is designed to be used as a stand-alone desktop unit or it can be installed into a 1/2 height drive bay of a desktop PC. Each RMM-IU80 can accept one RMM and interfaces with the desktop or notebook PC using an IEEE-1394 Firewire cable.

Power can be provided by the internal PC 12Vdc power supply just like a standard memory drive, or via an external wall-wart style power supply.

General Specifications

Memory Module Accepted:	One TEAC MDR-80 RMM (hard drive and solid state models accepted) Also, compatible with USB model RMM.
Use:	Desktop and installation into standard 1/2 height drive bay of desktop PC.
Controls:	Release Switch (commands proper disengage of the RMM with the PC and ejection of the RMM handle for proper removal).
LED Indicators:	Latch (RMM is engaged and locked), Active (RMM is communicating with the PC), and Power (proper 12Vdc power is being received.
Dimensions:	5.75" W x 1.6"H x 7.56"D (without removable cover)
Weight:	<2kg
Power:	12Vdc internal PC drive power connector 12Vdc wall-wart style power connector
Signal Interfaces:	(2) 6-pin IEEE-1394 connectors
Color:	Black
Cables Provided:	Internal PC drive power supply interface cable 90-240 VAC wall-wart (for desk top use) IEEE-1394 6-pin to 6-pin cable IEEE-1394 6-pin to 4-pin cable (for use with notebook PC's)

TEAC Aerospace Technologies
MISSION DATA RECORDERS
1 Cupania Circle, Monterey Park, CA 91755 • tel: 323.837.2715 • fax: 323.837.2815 • email: airborne@teacaerospace.com • www.teac-aerospace.com
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TAB 21
Pg 2 of 4

USCENTCOM FOIAs 17-0385, 18-0461, 19-0057L
071 05/21/2019

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MDR-80

More than 40 customers have selected the MDR-80 as their production baseline digital mission recorder due to its flexible design, wide-range capability, and high level of quality and performance. Its flexible modular architecture provides a wide variety of operational configurations and unique functional capabilities not offered by any other recorder. It provides a logical cost effective digital technology solution to the new generation of airborne digital video and mission data recording requirements.

TAB 21
Pg 3 of 4

Applications include AH-64 Apache, F-16, F-18, F-15, Eurofighter, AMX, S-3 USN, AC-130H, ARH/HAD Tiger Attack Helicopter, French AF Fennec Helos, P-3C, Litening Pod, Pilatus PC-21/PC-9, A-310 MRT, A-109M, SH-60, HAL/IAF LCA, HAL HJT-36, Global Hawk/Fire Scout, CN 235-300M, US Army ERMP UAV, C-130J.

right attitude / right approach / right alongside
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TAB 22

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TAB 23
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TEDAC
TADS Electronic Display and Control System

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TDR 24 pg 1 of 2



PD071-066



PD071-065

TEDAC

Lockheed Martin entered a contract in June 2000 to produce the TADS Electronic Display and Control (TEDAC) unit in support of the Apache Multi-Year II agreement between The Boeing Company and the U.S. Army. Lockheed Martin's new TEDAC replaces the Apache's original optical relay tube (ORT), becoming the first TADS/PNVS item funded by the Army for modernization. The modernized Apache cockpit with TEDAC gives the co-pilot/gunner a sharper image and more survivable space, while significantly reducing operation and support (O&S) costs.

TEDAC eliminates the complex optical path of the ORT, which significantly reduces parts count. TEDAC eliminates the old heads-down display and provides a single, large flat-panel display. This display uses active-matrix liquid crystal display technology to produce the highest resolution imagery possible for the Apache.

TEDAC increases effectiveness and situational awareness. Operationally, the co-pilot/gunner no longer requires the heads-down display for targeting. Instead, the co-pilot/gunner looks directly ahead at the high-resolution TEDAC display panel to view imagery.

TEDAC accommodates a more efficient manufacturing process and simpler field maintenance operations. It will also reduce maintenance and operational downtime by over 50 percent.

Lockheed Martin, under contract with the U.S. Army, has produced 105 TEDAC systems and is currently under contract to produce an additional 283. The plan is to retrofit the entire U.S. Army Apache fleet and provide the option for Apaches owned by international customers.

Features

- Compatible with:
  - A-model and D-model Apaches
  - Aviation night vision imaging system
- Eliminates ORT direct-view optics and heads-down display
- Removed and replaced in 2 hours at the flightline
- Isolates faults to one of its four LRMs
- Increases mean time between maintenance actions (MTBMA) by a factor of 10
- Reduces maintenance actions by approximately 90%
- Utilizes active matrix liquid crystal display (AMLCD) technology for improved imagery
- New display measures approximately 5 x 5 inches and has 960 x 960 pixels for high-resolution imagery

Modernization

TEDAC's modular design allows Apache maintainers to replace it at the flightline. The mechanical and electrical interfaces for TEDAC are compatible with the existing Apache airframe. Thus, TEDAC can be produced and integrated into new D-model Apaches or be provided as an upgrade for fielded A-model Apaches. Removal of the fielded ORT and its replacement with the new TEDAC requires approximately 2 hours—1 hour for ORT removal and 1 hour for TEDAC installation. This significant improvement to TADS/PNVS will contribute to annual O&S cost savings for the Army.

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Front top: PD072-068; Front bottom: DD71-064

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Pages 77 through 82 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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