



**NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN**

Kiwi Base, Bamyan Airfield, Bamyan, AFGHANISTAN
Telephone: **PSR(IC)3** Email: **PSR(IC)3**
(Unclas)

NZPRT 2000-1-31-03

11 August 2010

NZPRT BAMYAN SUPINTREP 004/10

KT2 CONTACT 3 AUGUST 2010

References:

- A. NZPRT BAMYAN KT2 TIC Report 3 Aug 10 dated 3 Aug 10
- B. NZPRT BAMYAN AAR dated 9 Aug 10
- C. Update Brief correct as at 071200 Aug 10.
- D. KT2 TIC dated 3 Aug 10

Introduction

1. Ref A provided initial reporting on the KT2 contact of 3 Aug 10 at DAHANE SARBOLAQ IVO KARIMAK (GR 42S VE 14340 04855). The purpose of this document is to consolidate subsequent SECRET-level HUMINT reporting to analyse what occurred and to provide a predictive assessment as to what course of action this INS group may take in the near future.

Location

2. Figure one shows the location of the contact in AO NORTH, NZPRT BAMYAN AO.




Figure One



Contact Site

Contact Sequence of Events

3. A detailed sequence of events at the initial contact site is at Ref B. In summary, KT2 was contacted in a complex attack at 031620DAug10. Initiated by a CW-IED the attack was pressed with multiple RPG direct fires and small arms. SAF included PKM and AK-47. It remains possible that a DRAGUNOV SVD was used by a marksman. The 14-strong INS group occupied four Firing Positions (see Annex A). Following the prolonged engagement, the group withdrew intact to the South. INS probably rallied at SARBOLAQ (30 mins) before retiring to Abdullah KALTA's house in GARDENDEH (2.5 hours) or TIRGIRAN. After drinking tea to celebrate their success, and spending the night, the group dispersed to various homes around the TIRGIRAN area. References B-D contain imagery and maps already distributed.

Tactical Leader Engagement Reporting

4. Annex C captures the most relevant HUMINT-based reports received thus far.
5. On the balance of reporting, 14 INS were directly involved:

a. Leaders.

- (1) Commander Abdullah KALTA.
- (2) **PSR(sen)1**
- (3) Malawi NEMATULLAH.

b. Probable Involvement.

- (1) Qari MIRAJ (IED Trigger man).
- (2) **PSR(sen)1**
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)

(9) PSR(sen)1
(10)

c. Possible Involvement.

(1) PSR(Sen)1
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

6. Despite two reports, it is assessed that Qari MUSA was not involved.

7. In accordance with established TB practice, a disinformation campaign is likely to have been carried out by PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1

8. Some evidence points to a degree of collusion by PSR(S)1 PSR(S)1 role during TSE also raises suspicion. This is to be investigated.

Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) Reporting

9. No definitive conclusions can be drawn by the TSE. Due to the tactical threat, exact Firing Points were not fully identified or exploited. EOD exploitation concludes that:

It is difficult to identify the type of explosive or makeup of the IED given the damage caused to the SOE by the fire. Given the damage done to the vehicle and the distance that fragmentation was found it is my opinion that the explosive was military grade high explosive, either recovered from ordnance or an anti-tank mine. Explosive weight would have been between 5-8 kg.

10. HUMINT reporting suggests that the *mine* may have been a yellow AT-mine 'used by the MUJAHIDDIN against the Russians'. The weight may indicate a bulky device similar to the widely available yellow or green TC-6 AT mine of Italian manufacture. This incident shares some characteristics of the nearby 5 JUL 10 attack on the road convoy. Similar blast effects and crater size were reported, and comparable incendiary effects were observed. In both cases, a white command wire, with neatly clipped ends at the assessed Firing Points, was recorded. The TTP of supporting the IED with direct fires is the major point of difference. INS may have used the event to test or refine their emerging tactics against a more vulnerable target.

Analysis

11. This successful complex attack marks a significant improvement in the capabilities of TWB-based INS. Well-sited and aggressively executed, the IED ambush was followed by accurate direct fires, layered according to the weapon systems available. Of particular concern may be the advent of a marksman-type weapon used with reasonable efficacy by an out-of-area fighter. The presence of potentially more highly trained foreign fighters cannot be discounted. The type of IED used may indicate that previously reported RC-

IED devices may not be available in the area. Alternatively, the success of a relatively simple device may encourage INS to continue to use basic command wires to initiate readily available AT mines or other military grade explosives. Following an unusually lengthy fire-fight, INS were able to break contact and withdraw via a covered egress route. This indicates either increased confidence or an enhanced risk threshold. Although CAS did respond, it remains possible that INS calculated that the poor weather at the time may have decreased the risk of air interdiction.

12. Given that the original INS plan may have been to attack either the (static) ANP CP at ISH PESHTA, or the Provincial Governor's convoy as it travelled to BAGHLAN, this event may indicate a sound degree of flexibility and tactical agility. That the ground was well chosen may alternatively indicate a contingency plan to engage an opportunity target travelling from ISH PESHTA. In either case, this event demonstrates a willingness to target heavily-armed PRT convoys at close range to cause maximum destruction.

13. The KARIMAK area has been used to conduct an ambush as recently as 9 APR 10. The advantages it offers are good coverage of a relatively isolated stretch of ^{PSR(S)1} (at almost maximum distance from both ROMERO or KIWI BASE) and close proximity to both northern TWB and the INS C2 node in GARDENDEH/TIRGIRAN. This particular site offers a staging area and direct egress route through what is likely to be a broadly supportive population in SARBOLAQ. That so many INS-linked LNs happened to be in the area also suggests an effective early warning/surveillance network. This may be exacerbated by ongoing collusion with ^{PSR(S)1} persons who are well-placed to inform of PRT activity. Evidence also points to a deliberate disinformation campaign to reduce PRT situational awareness.

14. The probable withdrawal route through GARDENDEH offers the advantage of nil ANSF activity and a population largely tolerant of INS aims. KALTA may have a house in this village located just a 2.5 hour walk from SARBOLAQ.

15. Latest HUMINT reports suggest that INS gathered at KALTA's TIRGIRAN house during the evening of 3 Aug 10. They were reportedly observed drinking *chai* in this location before dispersing to home compounds around the TIRGIRAN area on 4 Aug 10. KALTA, ^{PSR(sen)1} and NEMATULLAH are all currently assessed to be in their homes in TIRGIRAN BOLA (Upper). The exact locations are unknown. KALTA is reported to have a large home separated into distinct compounds for his family and fighters. Eight fighters are normally billeted there. 20-21 fighters are reported to be currently in this location. KALTA maintains a local guard force in addition to an 'early warning' system comprised of armed sentries with VHF radios. Given the absence of a direct threat and the advent of RAMAZAN, he may be tempted to remain there for a few days. TIRGIRAN provides an isolated population, largely supportive of TB aims. KALTA is reportedly a popular local figure having assumed command of the 70 or so TB fighters formerly under command of ^{PSR(sen)1}. KALTA may be in receipt of, and be distributing, funds from TBSL in PAKISTAN. His relation with the seemingly absent ^{PSR(sen)1} and Qari MUSA is unclear.

16. KALTA's INS group are reported to be 'agitated'. Given the recent success, and INS reasoning that RAMAZAN is an ideal time for martyrdom, further activity is likely in the near future. The prime combat indicator will be a further INS concentration in TIRGIRAN.

Assessment

17. INS responsible for the 3 Aug 10 KARIMAK attack are assessed to be currently active. Locally-based TWB INS may be supported by foreign fighters. Such INS maintain an enhanced capability to use IED, RPG and SAF including marksmen. Indicators exist to suggest an intent to conduct further offensive action. Given their central location, this can be expected anywhere in NE BAMYAN from ISH PESHTA, along the SHIKARI VY, to south SHIBAR. Timings are not clear. It is possible that a plan be may formulated and actioned within the next few days.

18. MLCOA. INS may use their recent success to reinforce their *safe-haven* in TALA-WA-BARFAK. Attempts are likely to be made to convince LNs of TB moral and military superiority. Further IEDs are possible against ANSF, CF and international actors between T-W-B and CP G1. An attack in the GHANDAK area is possible. A kidnapping attempt of Chinese mining personnel at ISH PESTA remains possible. INS activity in south SHIBAR remains possible.

19. MDCOA. A complex attack with IED supported by RPG/SAF targeting ANP/CF patrols along MSR from ISH PESHTA to SHIKARI VY or south SHIBAR.

DRAFTED BY: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 RELEASED BY: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

A/S2/S2

S2

Annexes:

- A. Contact Site
- B. Probable INS Route from Contact Site to current Location
- C. HUMINT-based Post Incident Reporting
- D. TSE Summary

Distribution:

PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1

List of NZ and partner entities in receipt of INTREP

PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1

PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1

ANNEX A to
SUPINTREP 004/10
dated 11 Aug 10

Contact Site

ISAF SECRET

KT2 CONTACT IVO KARIMAK 3 Aug 10 SUPINTREP

Target No. NI
MGRS 42S VE 42S
VE 14340 04855

TIRGIRAN

GARDEDEH PA'IN I

LN stated to KT5 Terp that the track is 4hrs between
GARDEDEH and ISH PESTA

A/S2 COMMENT: INS Posn closer than previous contacts, Likely INS Gp higher level of training. Possible use of Foreign Fighters cannot be discounted. KT2 Plt report accurate SAF into veh front windscreens. Possible Marksman/Sniper collocated with RPG team COMMENT ENDS

DO ABE Village

1706hrs Second Posn reported
42S VE 14249 05028

1701hrs Original Posn reported
42S VE 1417 0505

- Likely INS Exfil
- Poss INS ABFL
- Likely INS ABFL
- Foot Tracks
- RPG Posn
- Marksman Posn
- Poss RPG Posn
- KT2 HMMWV
- KT2 UA Hilux
- IED Triggerman Location



ISH PESTA CP I

Dir of Travel

Approx Scale

NZPRT S2 Cell	Overview of Contact Area	ISAF-SECRET	While all care has been taken in the making of this product S2 Cell accepts no responsibility for any inaccuracies contained herein	12 Aug 10
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ISAF-SECRET

KT2 CONTACT IVO KARIMAK 3 Aug 10 SUPINTREP

Target No. Nil
MGRS 42S VE 42S
VE 14340 04855



Probable location of firing point
35m from IED in re-entrant

SOE Approx 42S VE 14347
04852 underneath Right Front
Wheel Arch immobilising Veh
•Veh caught fire after explosion
•Starting receiving incoming
SAF/RPG fire

Road impassable alternative
route shown in green

Approx 35m of Wire found
leading to Triggerman Posn
Triggerman was within Blast
radius

1701hrs Fallback Posn reported
42S VE 1417 0505

A/S2 Comment: Triggerman within Blast radius, Possible injuries to triggerman including:
•Burns
•Frag/Shrapnel
•Covered in Dust/Debris
•Loss of hearing
•Required checks of health clinics IVO area including:
•GARDEDEH
•ISH PESTA
•SARE GULI
•DO ABE
•TALA
•BARFEK


- Likely INS Exfil Routes
- Likely INS ABFL Posn
- Likely INS Posn
- Foot Tracks
- IED Triggerman Loc
- Alternate Route



NZPRT S2 Cell	Enlargement of Contact Area	ISAF-SECRET	While all care has been taken in the making of this product S2 Cell accepts no responsibility for any inaccuracies contained herein	12 Aug 10
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ANNEX B to
SUPINTREP 004/10
dated 11 Aug 10

Probable INS Route from Contact Site to current Location



HUMINT-based Post Incident Reporting

1. At 031800 Aug 10, S2 spoke with **ANSF** who relayed the following information:

a. The group responsible was:

- (1) NEMATULLAH,
- (2) **PSR(sen)1**, and
- (3) Abdullah KALTA leading 15 fighters.

2. **ANSF** stated the group were planning to attack ISH PESTA ANP CP when NZPRT patrol came along.

3. At approximately 031800 Aug 10, ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3} received a phone call from **PSR(sen)1** stated was currently in POL-E KHOMRI but provided the following information regarding the KT2 contact:

a. The group involved numbered 14 personnel including:

- (1) Maulawi NEMATULLAH,
- (2) Abdullah KALTA,
- (3) **PSR(sen)1**
- (4) Qari MIRAJ,
- (5) **PSR(sen)1**
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)

4. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** The fact that **PSR(sen)1** could provide details of this group whilst in POL-E KHOMRI arouses suspicion. It is probable that **PSR(sen)1** had prior knowledge of a pending attack. **PSR(sen)1** employers ^{PSR(R)1} were unable to locate him. **COMMENT ENDS.**

5. At 04 Aug 10, NZPOL representatives were meeting with ANP

provided the following information:

- a. The group involved in the contact including NEMATULLAH, **PSR(Sen)1**, and 15 others. They are currently in GARDENDEH PA'IN Village.

6. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT.** GARDENDEH PA'IN Village and surrounding areas such as TIRGIRAN Village have been previously assessed to be a TWB INS C2 node. PSR(sen)1 was able to provide general descriptions of possible house locations for PSR(sen)1 and NEMATULLAH in GARENDEH PA'IN Village. PSR(S)1
COMMENT ENDS.

7. At 04 Aug 10,

the following information:

- b. The group was led by Comd Abdullah KALTA with 13 other persons.
- c. These persons were:
 - (1) Commander Abdullah KALTA,
 - (2) PSR(Sen)1 ,
 - (3) Qari MIRAJ,
 - (4) PSR(Sen)1 ,
 - (5) PSR(Sen)1
 - (6) PSR(Sen)1
 - (7) PSR(Sen)1
 - (8) Malawi NEMATULLAH, and
 - (9) PSR(Sen)1
- d. PSR(Sen)1 , PSR(Sen)1 , and teacher Maulawi NEMATULLAH were involved in the attack.
- e. The attack was planned at the home of Commander Abdullah KALTA which is located in the Dahane NAYAK Village (TIGIRAN Valley). Commander Abdullah KALTA and the others are currently at this location.
- f. This is the same group of Taliban that attacked a van full of LNs en route to BAND-E MIR last week in GHORBAND District.
- g. Prior to the event, there had been a rumour in DO-ABE of an attack to be conducted on ISH PESHTA ANP CP or the PRT.
- h. There was no cellular phone service to contact NZPRT but that he/she had reported the information of the pending attack to DO-ABE ANP PSR(Sen)1 ANP did not treat the report seriously.
- i. He/she did not know anything about future attack plans but may have additional information by the next meet at 1430 hours 04 August 2010.
- j. He/she would lead CF to the residence of Commander Abdullah KALTA if asked.

- k. **PSR(Sen)1** and Qari MUSA are both currently in PAKISTAN.
- l. **PSR(Sen)1** staff (soldiers) had gone to fight in DAHANE BAGHLAN.

8. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT.** There is a link between the INS group and **PSR(Sen)1** Direct involvement, or at least prior knowledge, by **PSR(Sen)1** is probable. After action interviews with KT2 members reveal that the road between DO-ABE and ISH PESTA had been unusually quiet. It is probable that some form of rumour was circulating in DO-ABE of an impending attack. **COMMENT ENDS.**

9. At 041900 Aug 10, KT3 elements reported the following information after a meeting with **PSR(Sen)1** in BAGHAK Bazaar:

- a. **PSR(Sen)1** had been following the convoy when it was attacked. The contact was initiated by an IED and lasted about two minutes. Small arms fire and RPG volleys then followed. 9 RPG were fired. **PSR(Sen)1**
- b. **PSR(Sen)1** stated that he had immediately returned to inform the ISH PESTA ANP CP to seek help.
- c. **PSR(Sen)1** stated that **PSR(Sen)1** from BARFAK Bazaar had TB links and was likely to be involved. He also mentioned **PSR(Sen)1** and Qari MIRAJ.
- d. **PSR(Sen)1** stated that ^{PSR(Sen)} saw the person firing the RPGs. ^{PSR(Sen)} had not seen him before, but noticed that he 'didn't miss'.

10. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** Statements from NZ personnel involved in the contact confirm that it lasted approximately 25 minutes. **PSR(Sen)1** GARDENDEH PA'IN-a known INS C2 location. ^{PSR(Sen)} presence at the contact site is beyond coincidence. It is probable that ^{PSR(Sen)} is linked with the INS group involved in the contact. ^{PSR(Sen)} may engage with NZPRT to maintain favour for ongoing development projects, provide disinformation and collect information for INS. **COMMENT ENDS.**

11. At 051430D Aug 10, KT5 relayed the following information following discussion with DO-ABE NDS **PSR(Sen)1**

- a. Maulawi Abdullah KALTA was one of the RPG firers.
- b. There were 14 personnel in the group.
- c. **PSR(Sen)1** and NEMATULLAH were involved.
- d. **PSR(Sen)1** and NEMATULLAH were the leaders of the attack.
- e. The INS split into two groups, with one group of six heading north whilst the remaining group of eight went south to TIRGIRAN Village to the house of Abdullah KALTA.

12. **NZ PRT S2 COMMENT.** PSR(Sen)1 is currently under investigation for collusion by NZPRT S2 Cell. **COMMENT ENDS.**

13. At 052015D Aug 10, A/S2 met with PSR(Sen)1 at NZPRT. PSR(Sen)1 was in BAMIAN escorting an PSR(R)1 patrol. PSR(Sen)1 stated that had received a phone call from one of contacts (rated C3) in TWB. The contact told PSR(Sen)1 the following:

- a. PSR(Sen)1 is no longer in charge. Abdullah KALTA is now in charge of the group involved and has 60 persons with him IVO DEWALAK/GARDENDEH area.
- b. KALTA and group no longer respect the truce between TB and TWB elders.
- c. The group will go *after us*. PSR(Sen)1 was unsure whether the contact meant PSR(R)1 or CF elements.
- d. KALTA is doing this in order to receive funding from PAKISTAN.
- e. PSR(Sen)1 stated PSR(Sen)1 contact does not know the current intentions of the group.

14. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** Both PSR(Sen)1 and MUSA are absent from TWB. It is probable that there has been a shift in TB leadership allowing a more energetic faction to assert control and conduct attacks. The likely motive is both ideological and financial. **COMMENT ENDS.**

15. On the afternoon of 5 Aug 10, SNO met with PSR(Sen)1 gave a list of persons PRT 'should be worried about':

- a. KALTA from TIRGIRAN (PSR(Sen)1 heard a report of KALTA being seen with 14 persons near the contact site).
- b. Malawi NEMATULLAH.
- c. PSR(Sen)1
- d. Qari MUSA.
- e. PSR(Sen)1
- f. PSR(Sen)1, PSR(S)1 reported that PSR(Sen)1 spoke with PSR(Sen)1 on 5 Aug 10. PSR(Sen)1 had spent the day on the ground questioning local villagers. Villagers stated that they had seen 20 persons in the DAHANE SARBOLAQ area prior to the contact, 12 of whom were PAKISTANI and ARAB fighters.
- g. PSR(Sen)1 stated that the attack was approved by PSR(Sen)1 PSR(Sen)1 a former TB regime notable who currently lives in KABUL.

²PSR(Sen)1 is a PSR(Sen)1 and was the PSR(Sen)1 during the Taliban era. When the CF arrived in the area PSR(Sen)1 fled and spent time in PAKISTAN and IRAN before returning to AFGHANISTAN. PSR(Sen)1 is one of the three key players in KAHMARD District and wields a significant amount of influence

PSR(Sen)1 has two lieutenants in the area, PSR(Sen)1, and PSR(Sen)1

- h. The local planners for the attack are KALTA, NEMATULLAH and MIRAJ.
 - i. All locals spoken to say they saw no-one tampering with the road.
16. At 071400D Aug 10, S2 elements spoke to PSR(Sen)1 who reported:
- a. Maulawi NEMATULLAH, Abdullah KALTA, and Qari MIRAJ are in the mountains IVO TIRGIRAN (GR 42S 23061 91545) and have likely returned to their houses.
 - b. KALTA has 'good skills' and that the rest of the INS in his group were trained in PAKISTAN.
 - c. There are 15-16 TB in this group armed with AK-47s, PKMs, RPGs and (perhaps) one DRAGUNOV.
 - d. The mine used in the ambush was a yellow AT mine used by the MUJAHIDEEN against the RUSSIANS (NFI).
 - e. The group purchased weapons using money received from TB leaders in DAHAN-E GHORI. PSR(Sen)1 also said that when INS are not killed during or arrested within three days after an attack, they begin planning for a new one.
17. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** The possible inclusion of a DRAGUNOV rifle in the group responsible may explain the accurate fire vehicles received during the contact. This may point to evolving tactics by TWB TB including the possibility of either foreign involvement or improved training. **COMMENT ENDS.**
18. At 071900D Aug 10, PSR(Sen)1 PSR(Sen)1 are reporting LNs who help NZPRT in GHANDAK area to the TB. PSR(Sen)1 also gave the following:
- a. At 052100 Aug 10, 1x TB armed, entered GHANDAK asking for directions to PSR(Sen)1 house. PSR(Sen)1 & TB per left together on motorbike.
 - b. On 04 Aug 10, LNs moving from GHANDAK to JALMESH report 6-7 TB in hills near an encampment.
 - c. On 05 Aug 10, LN went to investigate. No TB personnel were present but the camp appeared to be well-established.
19. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** It is possible that PSR(Sen)1 will reinforce the actions of the TB group in KARIMAK/GARDENDEH/TIRGIRAN by continuing to preach support to TB in GHANDAK Mosques. **COMMENT ENDS.**
20. At 081135, S2 met with PSR(Sen)1 stated the following:

ANP Officer

PSR(Sen)1

⁴ Reported to spread Anti-CF propaganda around GHANDAK area.

PSR(Sen)1

PSR(Sen)1

- a. ^{PSR(Ser)} has a witness to the attack who will come to ANP HQ IOT pass on information.
- b. ^{PSR(Ser)} intends to go to KAHMARD IOT examine the incident scene.
- c. The name of the area where the attack occurred is DAHANE SARBOLAQ.
- d. ^{PSR(Ser)} has tasked a Reconnaissance Officer to conduct a site investigation and is waiting for the report.
- e. ^{PSR(Ser)} stated that he is sure the INS will conduct another attack in the near future.
- f. ^{PSR(Ser)} gave a list of names of people involved in the attack. Their current location is in GARDENDEH/TIRGIRAN area:

- (1) ABDULLAH, son of **PSR(Sen)1** (confirmed as AKA Abdullah KALTA);
- (2) NEMATULLAH, **PSR(Sen)1**
- (3) **PSR(Sen)1**
- (4) **PSR(Sen)1**
- (5) **PSR(Sen)1** ;
- (6) **PSR(Sen)1** ;
- (7) **PSR(Sen)1** is a variant of MIRAJ;
- (8) **PSR(Sen)1**
- (9) **PSR(Sen)1**
- (10) **PSR(Sen)1**

21. On 9 Aug 10, **PSR(Sen)1** submitted the following **PSR(Sen)1** report:

- a. The PRT attack on 3 August 2010 near KARIMAK Village was planned and led by Commander Abdullah QALTA (aka KALTA).
- b. Fourteen persons were involved: four at ground level and ten in the mountains overlooking the ambush site.
- c. The IED/mne was set and detonated by Commander Abdullah QALTA. QALTA, **PSR(Sen)1**, Qari MIRAJ and **PSR(Sen)1** made up the IED team that was positioned in a fighting hole at ground level in a dry river bed.
- d. Persons on the high ground included: Malawi NEMATULLAH, ^{PSR(Sen)1} **PSR(Sen)1**, **PSR(Sen)1**, ^{PSR(Sen)1} **PSR(Sen)1**, ^{PSR(Sen)1} **PSR(Sen)1**, ^{PSR(Sen)1} **PSR(Sen)1** and **PSR(Sen)1**.

- e. IED team was armed with one IED, one RPG and three AK-47s. The IED was a command wire IED detonated by connecting a two wires to a motorcycle battery.
- f. High ground elements were armed with three PK machineguns, one RPG and AK-47s.
- g. The LEC stated that Malawi NEMATULLAH, Qari MIRAJ, **PSR(Sen)1** and **PSR(Sen)1** have been trained in Pakistan. Malawi NEMATULLAH had been specifically trained in IED construction and deployment. Commander Abdullah QALTA had been trained in the construction and deployment of IEDs by Malawi NEMATULLAH.
- h. The positions in the mountains acted as spotters to notify the IED team of the NZPRT convoy's approach. The IED team was positioned in a fighting hole dug in the dry river bed adjacent to the river bed crossing (approximately forty metres). The IED/anti-tank mine was placed near a bend in the road as the road dips into and crosses the dry river bed.
- i. QALTA detonated the IED on the first HMMWV. The detonation was followed up by RPG fire from the IED position. The high ground element then opened up with machinegun and RPG fire on the other vehicles in the convoy.
- j. The IED team's secondary objective was to capture any survivors from the IED as prisoners while the high ground elements concentrated fire on the remaining patrol elements to deter a rescue. The capture operation was aborted when additional elements (possibly ANP) arrived on scene.
- k. The IED team ran up the dry river bed to the base of the mountains and then escaped into the mountains. The attackers initially withdrew to the home of Commander Abdullah QALTA, located in the DAHANE NAYAK Village (TIRGIRAN Valley).
- l. The members of this team have now gone back to their homes in the TIRGIRAN Valley. QALTA is currently at his home in DAHANE NAYAK Village.
- m. **PSR(Sen)1** did not know anything about future attack plans but stated that when this team of Taliban prepares for another attack they will all meet at Commander Abdullah QALTA's house to plan the attack.
- n. **PSR(Sen)1** stated that this team of Taliban has no foreign fighters or specialized weapons other than the ones mentioned in this report.

21. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** Although described as a very credible source, the level of detail raises questions as to how this information was obtained. The suggestion of a 'snatch squad' is not probable on the balance of reporting: only a few ejected cases were located during TSE at this sight suggesting one IED trigger-man and perhaps one AK firer. Given the terrain and distance for exfiltration, it is also improbable that a wounded

prisoner would be carried by this group. **COMMENT ENDS.**

22. On 9 Aug 10, **PSR(Sen)1** ANP ^{PSR(Sen)1} conducted An ANP TSE. He picked up two LNs in DO-ABE en route: **PSR(Sen)1**. The following was reported to PRT:

- a. **PSR(Sen)1** identified the IED firing point 30m away from the contact site. Two rockets were fired from this point.
- b. LNs from adjacent houses initially said they had seen 2 rockets fired from this position, and then later said they had heard 2 rockets.
- c. **PSR(Sen)1** went to the firing points on the map NZPRT had given him. **PSR(Sen)1** and **PSR(Sen)1** said the INS were not firing from these positions. When asked how they knew this, the pair appeared very scared.
- d. **PSR(Sen)1** and **PSR(Sen)1** stated the group was firing from near the mountain heading to TIRGIRAN, a yellowish hill, more muddy than rock.
- e. **PSR(Sen)1** believes there were three AK-47 positions at the first firing point, judging from the types of brass and the footprints found. Approx 100m higher, two men with AKs were firing. Further up one man with a PKM was firing, but **PSR(Sen)1** believes all of ^{PSR(Sen)1} rounds would have been up in the air as there is no view to the EA. The fourth position is 100m from the top of the feature, where two men were firing a PKM.
- f. No RPGs were fired from these positions. All RPGs were fired from the firing point and from the left hand side.
- g. ANP did not check any high features to the right hand side.
- h. ANP handed over shell casings found at the bottom two sights, and RPG parts from around the IED site, as well as smoke butts at the bottom firing points.

PSR(C)4

PSR(IC)4

25. On 10 Aug 10, CO and S2 met with PSR(Sen)1

NDS. ^{PSR(Ser)} provided the following:

- a. PSR(Sen)1 expressed his condolences and He suggested that the INS action may have been a response to PSR(Sen)1 death.
- b. INS intend to conduct further offensive actions in GHORBAND, TWB and DAHANE GHORI.
- c. TWB group may conduct further action between ISH PESHTA, DAHANE SAYGHAN and SHIKARI.
- d. Leaders include KALTA, PSR(Sen)1 , NEMATULLAH.
- e. PSR(Sen)1 NEMATULLAH, KALTA and MUSA are responsible for the recent attack. They were all in TWB but operated from no fixed location, moving from house to mosque.
- f. INS were centred on TIRGIRAN. This provides easy access to MARQ (BARFAK), JALMESH and SHIBAR.
- g. MUSA lives in BARFAK and is seen at the mosque there.
- h. PSR(Sen)1 lives in BARFAK.
- i. PSR(Sen)1 and NEMATULLAH are in TIRGIRAN.

26. **S2 COMMENT:** PSR(Sen)1 provided non-specific information that is generally reported at every ANSF meeting. MUSA and PSR(Sen)1 were not directly involved in this attack. **COMMENT ENDS.**

27. At 10 Aug PSR(IC)4 , BAMYAN ANP PSR(Sen)1 presented the following info after ^{PSR(Ser)} recent visit to KAHMARD:

- a. The INS group of 15 was led by Malawi NEMATULLAH. They had PKs, AKs, RPGs and a mine. The trigger man was 20m away from the lead vehicle, the rocket man 30m. Two AK men where 40-50m away. Another was 60-70m away, and one man was on the high ground with a PK providing security. The attackers were ready when the convoy first went by. The attack happened when they returned. The local people where involved in the activity. The people saw them plant the IED, they support the TB so they did not say anything. ANP to the north and south reacted properly. When the ANP arrived, they scared off the TB and the TB escaped.
- b. PSR(Sen)1 ANP PSR(Sen)1 added that TB went to Abdullah's (KALTA) house after the attack. His house is in TIRGIRAN. Abdullah KALTA is TB shadow TWB Chief of Police, NEMATULLAH is the TB Governor and Qari MIRAJ is a group commander. The INS who conducted the attack live in TIRGIRAN. They are:

- (1) Abdullah (KALTA) PSR(Sen)1
- (2) Malawi NEMATULLAH PSR(Sen)1
- (3) PSR(Sen)1
- (4) PSR(Sen)1
- (5) PSR(Sen)1
- (6) PSR(Sen)1
- (7) PSR(Sen)1
- (8) PSR(Sen)1
- (9) PSR(Sen)1
- (10) PSR(Sen)1

28. PSR(Sen)1 ANP PSR(Sen)1 met with PRT 11 Aug 10. PSR(Sen)1 provided following information:

- a. TB leaders were: KALTA, PSR(Sen)1 and NEMATULLAH.
- b. After attack, INS moved SE to spend the night at KALTA's house. The following morning, the group dispersed to their home locs in the TIRGIRAN area.
- c. The IED trigger man was Qari MIRAJ. From TIRGIRAN, he now lives in ANADARAH.
- d. Two RPG firers were PSR(Sen)1 and PSR(Sen)1 who was wounded in the finger.
- e. KALTA lives in TIRGIRAN PA'IN ie. LOWER TIRGIRAN (Northern TIRGIRAN). He is the popular leader of 70 TB following the death of PSR(Sen)1. He has a huge compound with two living quarters: one is occupied by 8 family members, the other by 20-21 fighters, 8 of whom are always present. He has guards around his compound and an early-warning system in the TIRGIRAN area with armed look-outs equipped with two-way radios.
- f. PSR(Sen)1 also lives in TIRGIRAN PA'IN.
- g. NEMATULLAH lives in TIRGIRAN BOLA ie. UPPER TIRGIRAN (Southern TIRGIRAN). Exact locations are unknown.
- h. INS are 'aggravated' and plan to ambush PRT or ANP. They are ready for action and will not be slowed down by RAMAZAN. On the contrary, they believe that it would be beneficial to be martyred during RAMAZAN.

29. PSR(Sen)1 and PSR(Sen)1 related the following information 11 Aug 10 today regarding the INS group responsible for the 3 August 2010 attack:

- a. The INS group will not be affected by RAMAZAN. INS view martyrdom during RAMAZAN as more worthy than other, non-auspicious times.
- b. INS plan to attack PSR(S)1 (GR 42S VD 11907 63051). They believe they have destroyed the KAHMARD patrol, and are now focused on the SHIBAR patrol. An attack on LMH would allow INS ex-filtration routes to

the KHARZAR PASS and TIRGIRAN Village (GR 42S VD 23601 91545).

- c. **PSR(Sen)1** and **PSR(Sen)1** paid 1,000,000 PAK RUPEES to the **PSR(Sen)1** **PSR(Sen)1** to allow them to pass through the checkpoint with weapons, without being searched, at any time of their choosing.
- d. The TB flag had been raised in TIRGIRAN Village. TIRGIRAN Village is also referred to as DAHANE NAYAK.
- e. Qari MIRAJ is in currently in PAJMAN Village/DAHANE ZAW (GR 42S VE 238 122) at the head of the PAJMAN VY (NFI).
- f. **PSR(Sen)1** is currently in DEKTUR Village (GR 42S VE 22208 11817) IVO the graveyard (NFI).
- g. There are currently three to five PASHTUN or foreign males in TIRGIRAN village (NFI).

TSE Summary

1. Over the period 4-8 Aug 10, NZ PRT elements conducted TSE on the contact site. The following information and material was collected:

- a. The detonation of the CWIED occurred between the front wheel axle and the firewall of the vehicle and was approximately 0.4m to the right of the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. There were no indications of a pressure plate or other victim operated trigger mechanisms at the seat of explosion (SOE) or on the road.
- b. The target vehicle had caught fire as a result of the blast or from subsequent hits from RPG HEAT rounds. This fire burned at a temperature between 660 - 1300 degrees Celsius as indicated by the aluminium pooling in the crater. This resulted in no identifiable fragmentation from the IED being recovered from the scene.
- c. The crater formed at the SOE was 1.7m in diameter and 0.6m in depth. The fragmentation field formed by parts of the victim vehicle measured 75m in distance to the furthest *frag* and was shaped in a half circle with the rear doors of the vehicle forming the baseline.
- d. Blast crater was located on a forward slope of the road as the HMMWV entered a dry creek crossing point. Given the restrictive field of view from the cab of an armoured HMMWV it is unlikely that any of the occupants would have been able to identify disturbances to the road surface caused by IED emplacement.
- e. A command wire was identified buried and following the bank of the stream to the south of the SOE. The wire found at scene was a 45m long double strand white lamp cord with 2 joins in the length. Joins were sealed with clear to light yellow transparent cello-tape of unknown brand.
- f. The Firing Point was identified both by the termination of the command wire and the presence of fired shell casings. **NZPRT EOD COMMENT:** The presence of shell casings around the firing point proves that it was manned during the attack. The absence of any victim operated trigger mechanisms also supports this. It is most likely that the IED was command initiated by a trigger man with a power source as the vehicle passed over the device.
COMMENT ENDS.

2. **NZPRT EOD COMMENT:** It is difficult to identify the type of explosive or makeup of the IED given the damage caused to the SOE by the fire. Samples of the dirt surrounding the SOE have been taken for analysis. Given the damage done to the vehicle and the distance that fragmentation was found it is my opinion that the explosive was military grade high explosive, either recovered from ordnance or an anti-tank mine. Explosive weight would have been between 5-8 kg. Samples will be sent to **PSR(S)1** for analysis.
COMMENT ENDS.

