



**NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN**

Kiwi Base, Bamyan Airfield, Bamyan, AFGHANISTAN
Telephone: +**PSR(Sen)1**, **PSR(IC)3** Email: **PSR(IC)3**, **PSR(Sen)1**
(Unclas)

NZPRT 2050-1-1

09 October 2009

NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 268/09

Period: 081830DOCT09 – 091830DOCT09

Executive Summary

TALA-WA BARFEK: Local Mullah endeavours to resolve land dispute

DAY KUNDI: TB disallow roading projects

SHIBAR: Joint NZPRT/ANP patrol to SARKOSHAK valley

SHIBAR: **PSR(Sen)1** visits KIWI BASE

Area of Interest

1. ~~(R//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ **TALA-WA BARFEK.** A land dispute is believed to be occurring in the vicinity of TIRGIRAN village, TALA-WA BARFEK. With the lack of ANSF in this location a local Mullah (NFI) has taken it upon himself to resolve the dispute. Allegedly, one local national has already been killed over the dispute (NFI).
2. ~~(S//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ **NZPRT S2 COMMENT.** Over the last 5 months TIRGIRAN has been identified as a significant support area for TB, INS and criminals in TALA-WA BARFEK district. Reports have been received of TB flags openly flying in the village and of congregations and meetings of INS leaders occurring in the area. More recently **PSR(Sen)1** was reported as taking possession of IED components belonging to **PSR(Sen)1** and taking them to TIRGIRAN village. As seen in eastern AFGHANISTAN recently, shadow governments can thrive in the areas isolated from regular ANSF presence. The possibility that the unnamed Mullah has INS links and is seeking to establish a TB/INS based judiciary system cannot be discounted. **END COMMENT.**
3. ~~(S//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ **DAY KUNDI.** TB in DAY KUNDI and ORUZGAN provinces have reportedly threatened locals over the construction of roads through the two provinces. Allegedly TB heard views from village elders over several roading projects but decided against allowing construction of the roads. TB have warned locals that anyone assisting in the road construction would be punished.

Area of Operation

4. (~~R//REL ISAF, NATO~~) SHIBAR. On the 08 Oct 09, a joint ANP / NZPRT patrol meet with locals from SARKOSHAK valley¹, SHIBAR. The general sentiment from locals in the area was that the patrol should not be there overnight, commenting they could not being held responsible for the safety of the patrol.

5. (~~R//REL ISAF, NATO~~) The patrol also met with PSR(Sen)1 who is allegedly PSR(Sen)1 father in law. stated that he had not seen PSR(Sen)1 in 20 years even though PSR(Sen)1 son in law, PSR(Sen)1 also lives in the valley.

6. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 COMMENT. The population of SARKOSHAK remains wary of NZPRT patrols and there likely remains an anti-CF/ANSF attitude following the capture of PSR(Sen)1. It is unlikely that PSR(Sen)1 would not have seen PSR(Sen)1 in 20 years, given that PSR(Sen)1 had a house in the area. It remains likely that the SARKOSHAK valley area may be susceptible to TB influence and would provide support to TB / INS forces attempting to operate in the area. **END COMMENT.**

7. (~~R//REL ISAF, NATO~~) SHIBAR. On 09 Oct 09 PSR(Sen)1 approached the NZPRT to discuss current problems in SHIBAR. He stated that PSR(Sen)1 has been threatening him because PSR(sen)1 is conducting un-islamic activities PSR(sen)1

also stated that there was one instance where PSR(sen)1 PSR(sen)1 threw him out of the GHANDAK mosque. PSR(sen)1 stated that PSR(sen)1 is influencing the local population as they are poor and do not know any better.

8. (~~R//REL ISAF, NATO~~) PSR(sen)1 stated that on the 07 Oct 09, he had heard a disturbance outside his house. On moving outside to investigate, he spotted an individual with a gun (NFI) who fired a number of shots in the air before leaving. PSR(Sen)1 believes that this was a threat linked to PSR(sen)1.

9. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 COMMENT. In previous meetings with the NZPRT, PSR(Sen)1 has made no secret of his dislike for females gaining any education or employment. With female attendance decreasing with recent threats, it cannot be discounted that PSR(Sen)1 has threatened other individuals in the area. While he has not been linked directly to INS activity, it remains likely that PSR(Sen)1 is in contact with TB members and is spreading propaganda on their behalf. It is unknown at this time whether PSR(Sen)1 is directly responsible the threats made but is assessed as likely. PSR(Sen)1 is likely ideologically motivated towards the region becoming/remaining a strict Islamic society. **END COMMENT.**

¹ GR 42S VD 097 673

² PSR(sen)1 was the TB shadow governor for BAMYAN province. He was apprehended by ANP on the 02 Aug 09. He is currently in the custody of MOI in KABUL.

³ During questioning PSR(Sen)1 stated PSR(Sen)1 was passing anti-CF and anti-GIRoA propaganda.

DRAFTED BY: PSR(Sen)1, PSR(IC)3

RELEASED BY: PSR(IC)3, PSR(Sen)1

INTELLIGENCE
OPERATOR

S2

Distribution:

PSR(S)1, PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

List of distribution
of INTSUM to NZ
and partner entities

PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)3

PSR(S)1, PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3